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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 
13-1339 
Ruling Below: Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. Cal. 2014) 
The Circuit panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, based on Article III standing, of an 
action alleging willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
The panel held that the individual plaintiff had Article III standing to sue a website’s operator 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for publishing inaccurate personal information about 
himself. The panel also held that law of the case did not limit the district court in its final order, 
and it was free to reconsider its own prior ruling on standing , where the district court had neither 
been divested of jurisdiction nor submitted this case to the jury. 
Question Presented: Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who 
suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal 
statute. 
 
 
Thomas ROBINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situation 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
SPOKEO, INC., a California corporation 
Defendants 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on February 4, 2014 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
 
O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
We must decide whether an individual has 
Article III standing to sue a website’s 
operator under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
for publishing inaccurate personal 
information about himself. 
 
I 
 
Spokeo, Inc. operates a website that provides 
users with information about other 
individuals, including contact data, marital 
status, age, occupation, economic health, and 
wealth level. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo 
for willful violations of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), related to its website. 
Although he asserted that Spokeo’s website 
contained false information about him, 
Robins’s allegations of injury were sparse. 
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Spokeo moved to dismiss Robins’s original 
complaint for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction on the ground that Robins lacked 
standing sufficient under Article III of the 
United States Constitution.  
 
On January 27, 2011, the district court ruled 
that Robins had failed to allege an injury in 
fact because he had not alleged “any actual or 
imminent harm.” The court characterized 
Robins’s allegations as simply “that he has 
been unsuccessful in seeking employment, 
and that he is concerned that the inaccuracies 
in his report will affect his ability to obtain 
credit, employment, insurance, and the like.” 
The district court noted that “[a]llegations of 
possible future injury do not satisfy the 
[standing] requirements of Art. III” and 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice. 
 
Robins thereafter filed his First Amended 
Complaint (FAC). Similar to the original 
complaint, the FAC alleged willful violations 
of the FCRA. For example, the website 
allegedly described Robins as holding a 
graduate degree and as wealthy, both of 
which are alleged to be untrue. Robins, who 
is unemployed, described the misinformation 
as “caus[ing] actual harm to [his] 
employment prospects.” Remaining 
unemployed has cost Robins money as well 
as caused “anxiety, stress, concern, and/or 
worry about his diminished employment 
prospects.” 
Again, Spokeo moved to dismiss for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that 
Robins lacked standing under Article III. On 
May 11, the district court denied the 
motion and concluded that Robins had 
alleged a sufficient injury in fact, namely 
Spokeo’s “marketing of inaccurate consumer 
reporting information about” Robins. The 
court also ruled that the injury was traceable 
to Spokeo’s alleged violations of the FCRA 
and that the injury was redressable through a 
favorable court decision. 
 
On September 19, after Spokeo moved to 
certify an interlocutory appeal, the district 
court reconsidered its previous ruling on 
standing. It then ruled, contrary to its May 
11 order, that Robins failed to plead an injury 
in fact and that any injuries pled were not 
traceable to Spokeo’s alleged violations, 
dismissing the action. Robins timely 
appealed. 
 
II 
 
On appeal, Robins first argues that the law-
of-the-case doctrine prohibited the district 
court from revisiting its own May 11 
decision. In United States v. Smith, however, 
we held that the law-of-the-case doctrine 
does not apply “to circumstances where a 
district court seeks to reconsider an order 
over which it has not been divested of 
jurisdiction.” In this case, the district court 
was not divested of jurisdiction prior to its 
September 19 order. 
 
Although United States v. Alexander held 
that the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded a 
district court from reconsidering an 
evidentiary issue after a mistrial, we 
distinguished Alexander in Smith and do so 
again here. The rule from Alexander applies 
only to cases in which a submission to the 
jury separates the two decisions.  
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Here, because the district court had neither 
been divested of jurisdiction nor submitted 
this case to the jury, it was free to reconsider 
its own prior ruling. The law-of-the-case 
doctrine did not limit the district court. 
 
III 
 
Robins next argues that the FAC sufficiently 
alleges Article III standing and that the May 
11 ruling was correct. The FAC indeed 
alleges violations of various statutory 
provisions. Robins contends that because 
these provisions are enforceable through a 
private cause of action, they create statutory 
rights that he has standing to vindicate in 
court.  
 
The district court properly recognized that it 
would not have subject-matter jurisdiction if 
Robins did not have standing. The district 
court also correctly identified the three 
components of standing: (1) the plaintiff “has 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical”; 
(2) “the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) 
“it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, 
that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.” Although more may be 
required at later stages of the litigation, on a 
motion to dismiss, “general factual 
allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice.”  
 
A 
 
In standing cases that analyze statutory 
rights, our precedent establishes two 
propositions. First, Congress’s creation of a 
private cause of action to enforce a statutory 
provision implies that Congress intended the 
enforceable provision to create a statutory 
right. Second, the violation of a statutory 
right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to 
confer standing.  
 
Spokeo contends, however, that Robins 
cannot sue under the FCRA without showing 
actual harm. But the statutory cause of action 
does not require a showing of actual harm 
when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.  
 
The scope of the cause of action determines 
the scope of the implied statutory right. 
When, as here, the statutory cause of action 
does not require proof of actual damages, a 
plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory 
right without suffering actual damages. 
 
B 
 
Of course, the Constitution limits the power 
of Congress to confer standing. This 
constitutional limit, however, does not 
prohibit Congress from “elevating to the 
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, 
de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.” 
 
The issue before us is whether violations of 
statutory rights created by the FCRA are 
“concrete, de facto injuries” that Congress 
can so elevate. We are not the first Court of 
Appeals to face this question. In Beaudry, the 
Sixth Circuit considered whether an FCRA 
plaintiff suing under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n had 
sufficiently alleged an injury in fact by 
alleging a violation of the FCRA. The court 
identified two constitutional limitations on 
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congressional power to confer standing. First, 
a plaintiff “must be ‘among 
the injured,’ in the sense that she alleges the 
defendants violated her statutory rights.” 
Second, the statutory right at issue must 
protect against “individual, rather than 
collective, harm.” The Beaudry court held 
that the plaintiff satisfied both of these 
requirements.  
 
Robins is in the same position. First, he 
alleges that Spokeo violated his statutory 
rights, not just the statutory rights of other 
people, so he is “among the injured.” Second, 
the interests protected by the statutory rights 
at issue are sufficiently concrete and 
particularized that Congress can elevate 
them. Like “an individual’s personal interest 
in living in a racially integrated community” 
or “a company’s interest in marketing its 
product free from competition,” Robins’s 
personal interests in the handling of his credit 
information are individualized rather than 
collective. Therefore, alleged violations of 
Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to 
satisfy the injury-infact requirement of 
Article III. 
 
In addition to injury in fact, of course, 
standing requires causation and 
redressability. Where statutory rights are 
asserted, however, our cases have described 
the standing inquiry as boiling down to 
“essentially” the injury-in-fact prong. When 
the injury in fact is the violation of a statutory 
right that we inferred from the existence of a 
private cause of action, causation and 
redressability will usually be satisfied. First, 
there is little doubt that a defendant’s alleged 
violation of a statutory provision “caused” 
the violation of a right created by that 
provision. Second, statutes like the FCRA 
frequently provide for monetary damages, 
which redress the violation of statutory 
rights. Therefore, Robins has adequately pled 
causation and redressability in this case. 
 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Robins adequately 
alleges Article III standing. 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
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“9th Circuit Revives FCRA Suit Against Spokeo Site” 
Law360 
Kurt Orzeck 
February 4, 2014 
 
The Ninth Circuit on Tuesday revived a 
putative class action accusing “people search 
engine” Spokeo.com of willfully violating 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act by publishing 
false information about a Virginia man, 
saying he had constitutional standing to bring 
the complaint. 
 
Reversing a California federal judge's 
dismissal of Thomas Robins' suit against 
Pasadena-based Spokeo Inc., which compiles 
information from various online and offline 
sources into reports and sells them to 
subscribers, the appeals court said the alleged 
violations of his statutory rights sufficiently 
satisfied Article III's injury-in-fact 
requirement. 
 
Robins claimed he had suffered an actionable 
injury because the site provided prospective 
employers with inaccurate personal 
information about him and didn't exercise its 
responsibilities as a consumer reporting 
agency with fairness. He seeks to represent a 
class of individuals in a similar situation. 
 
Spokeo attorneys countered that there was no 
allegation that “something scandalous” was 
spread about Robins or that he actually lost 
employment as a result of the allegedly 
inaccurate information. 
 
The Ninth Circuit ruled Tuesday that a 
showing of actual harm isn't needed when a 
plaintiff sues for willful FCRA violations. 
 
“The scope of the cause of action determines 
the scope of the implied statutory right. 
When, as here, the statutory cause of action 
does not require proof of actual damages, a 
plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory 
right without suffering actual damage,” the 
court said. 
 
Robins filed suit in July 2010, alleging that a 
significant portion of the consumer report 
Spokeo had compiled about him was 
incorrect, including his employment status, 
marital status, age, educational background, 
number of children, “economic health” and 
“wealth level.” The profile also contained a 
picture of someone else, he claimed. 
 
Spokeo violated the FCRA by failing to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the 
information was accurate, according to the 
suit. 
 
A California federal judge granted Spokeo's 
motion to dismiss in January 2011, citing 
lack of standing. He ruled that Robins had 
“failed to allege that defendant caused him 
any actual or imminent harm” and his 
allegations of possible future injury did not 
satisfy standing requirements. 
 
Robins argued to the Ninth Circuit in 
November that U.S. District Judge Otis D. 
Wright II erred in finding that he hadn't 
alleged an injury-in-fact. 
 120 
 
The three-judge panel agreed, saying Robins’ 
personal interests in the handling of his credit 
information were individualized rather than 
collective, thus he had standing under Article 
III. 
 
The Tuesday opinion also noted that Robins 
had adequately pled causation and 
redressability, which are also required for 
standing. The defendant’s alleged violation 
of a FCRA statutory provision caused the 
violation of a right created by that provision, 
and the FCRA provides for monetary 
damages that redress statutory-right 
violations, according to the appeals court 
said. 
 
Steven Woodrow of Edelson PC, which is 
representing Robins, told Law360 on 
Tuesday that the Ninth Circuit decision is a 
victory for consumer rights. 
 
“The FCRA was passed because [the U.S.] 
Congress recognized that recklessly 
spreading false information about people to 
their potential creditors and employers is 
harmful in its own right and that consumers 
shouldn't have to prove the actual damages 
they've suffered,” he said. “The opinion 
recognizes the same thing and gives 
thousands of job and credit seekers who've 
had false information reported about them 
their day in court.” 
  
 121 
“SCOTUS to Decide if ‘Unharmed’ Plaintiffs Have Right to Sue” 
Reuters 
Alison Frankel 
April 27, 2015 
 
Just about a year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided not to hear a case involving a class 
action against a couple of Midwestern banks 
that didn’t post both of the required notices 
on its ATM machines. The banks’ petition for 
certiorari raised the same question that had 
piqued the Supreme Court’s interest in the 
2011 case First American Financial v. 
Edwards: Can Congress confer constitutional 
standing on otherwise uninjured consumers 
by giving them a private right of action? But 
the justices mysteriously dismissed First 
American on the last day of their term in 2012 
and were unwilling to revisit the tough 
question of Congress and consumers’ right to 
sue in the ATM case, prompting me to ask in 
a column if the Supreme Court had lost its 
zeal to curb consumer class actions. 
 
That may have been premature. On Monday, 
the justices granted the search site Spokeo’s 
petition for certiorari in Spokeo v. Robins, a 
case in which the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the certification of a class of 
consumers who claimed Spokeo owes them 
statutory damages for violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act. Spokeo’s counsel of 
record, Andrew Pincus of Mayer Brown, 
framed the question presented as broadly as 
it was in Edwards and the ATM case: 
“Whether Congress may confer Article III 
standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no 
concrete harm, and who therefore could not 
otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal 
court, by authorizing a private right of action 
based on a bare violation of a federal 
statute?” 
 
As Mayer Brown emphasized in its petition – 
and as amici including eBay, Facebook and 
Google underscored – the Supreme Court’s 
answer to that question will impact not just 
class actions brought under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act but also cases citing the 
Telephone Consumers Protection Act, the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, the Truth in 
Lending Act and a half-dozen other federal 
laws authorizing consumers to sue for 
statutory damages. Big businesses have been 
complaining for years that these laws give 
plaintiffs and their lawyers an unfair 
advantage because they can assert statutory 
damages claims for hundreds of millions of 
dollars on behalf of thousands of consumers 
who suffered no concrete harm. 
 
If the Supreme Court sides with Spokeo and 
holds that otherwise uninjured plaintiffs can’t 
sue for money damages based on statutory 
violations, big businesses will have another 
reason to fete Pincus, whose 2011 high court 
win in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion upheld 
the validity of mandatory arbitration clauses 
with class action waivers. “This is an 
important issue that the court should address 
and now it will,” Pincus told me. 
 
Pincus’ opponent in the Spokeo case is 
Deepak Gupta of Gupta Beck – who also 
represented class members in the Concepcion 
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case. In his brief opposing certiorari, Gupta 
argued both that the Supreme Court need not 
answer the abstract question Spokeo posed 
and that the named plaintiff in the class action 
against the search site had suffered actual 
harm when Spokeo published inaccurate 
personal information about him. (Among 
other things, the site said he was married 
when he was not.) Gupta was traveling and 
unavailable for comment but previously told 
me the distinction between injury-in-fact and 
injury-in-the-law is “philosophically 
incoherent.” 
 
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
overruled the suggestion of the U.S. solicitor 
general, who argued against review of the 
case in a brief the justices solicited. The 
Justice Department – which had previously 
urged the Supreme Court not to take the 2011 
Edwards case that the court ended up 
dismissing – walked back in the Spokeo brief 
from its argument that Congress has a broad 
right to a private right to sue. Instead, the 
SG’s brief claimed that lawmakers can 
elevate rights grounded in common law to 
statutory causes of action. “De facto injuries 
that were previously inadequate in law” can 
be transformed by Congress into “legally 
cognizable injuries,” according to the brief, 
when the law merely codifies longstanding 
principles of harm. 
 
I’m expecting to see a lot of amicus firepower 
on both sides of the Spokeo case. The future 
of consumer class actions is at stake. 
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“Supreme Court Weighs Right to Sue in Spokeo Case” 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jacob Gershman 
April 27, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
hear a case that could potentially make it 
easier for plaintiffs to bring class-action 
lawsuits against Internet companies for 
allegedly violating consumer data and 
privacy laws. 
 
The dispute involves a lawsuit against 
people-search site Spokeo Inc. over 
information it posted about an unemployed 
Virginia man. The plaintiff, Thomas Robins, 
says Spokeo got wrong details about his age, 
wealth, employment status and education 
level, portraying him as more educated and 
wealthier than he really was. 
 
Those alleged errors, he claims, hurt his 
employment prospects, causing him 
“economic, reputational, and emotional” 
injuries. A trial court dismissed his case, a 
decision that the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed last year, ultimately 
landing the case in the country’s top court. 
 
The lawsuit, which is seeking class action 
status, alleges violations of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, a federal law that regulates 
credits bureaus and sets standards over how 
consumer credit information is collected, 
stored and shared. 
 
Lawyers for Spokeo deny the violations, 
arguing that they’re not a consumer reporting 
agency, but an Internet search engine, and 
thus fall outside the scope of the law. But they 
also argue that Mr. Robins doesn’t have the 
right to get a court to hear his case because he 
hasn’t suffered a concrete harm — a 
constitutional bar that plaintiffs must meet — 
but merely alleges “speculative anxiety and 
concern about what might happen.” 
 
It’s that second argument that has piqued the 
high court’s interest. 
 
Mr. Robins says his injuries are more than 
speculative. His lawyers say he has “clearly 
alleged concrete and particularized injuries: 
economic harm to his employment 
prospects.” But they go further, arguing that 
the alleged statutory violations themselves 
are a sufficient basis to get a day in court. 
 
Deepak Gupta, an attorney for Mr. Robins, 
didn’t immediately have a comment on 
Monday. Mr. Robins is also represented by 
Edelson PC, a law firm founded by Jay 
Edelson, a class-action attorney who has 
made a career taking tech companies to court. 
 
A ruling in favor of Mr. Robins could have 
huge implications for large Internet 
companies that have millions of users by 
carving out a more elastic right to sue and 
giving Congress more power to define the 
judiciary’s role in settling disputes. 
 
While the specific lawsuit concerns Spokeo, 
tech companies like Google, Facebook and 
Yahoo are keeping a close eye on the case. A 
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single violation of the federal consumer law 
can go up to $1,000, which could translate 
into a much bigger figure in a class action. 
 
Spokeo, in a statement, said it’s pleased that 
the high court “decided to consider this 
important constitutional issue raised by our 
petition: whether the Constitution permits 
class actions seeking millions or billions of 
dollars even though class members have not 
suffered any injury.” 
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“No Injury? No Problem” 
The National Law Review 
Paul Scrudato, Brittany Robbins & Thomas Crispi 
May 31, 2015 
The Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari in Spokeo v. Robins, a case that has 
the potential to redefine standing in federal 
court. The Ninth Circuit’s February 2014 
decision permitted plaintiff Thomas Robins 
to establish standing under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) with nothing more 
than a speculative injury. This contravenes 
Supreme Court precedent, which finds 
standing when a plaintiff suffers a harm that 
is actual, distinct, palpable, and concrete; 
attenuated and hypothetical injuries do not 
constitute an injury-in-fact. The implications 
of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Spokeo v. 
Robins has grabbed the attention of 
companies in nearly every industry. Their 
concern, as expressed by the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce – granting standing to plaintiffs 
who have not suffered an injury-in-fact will 
open the flood gates to no-injury class actions 
brought under statutes that authorize a private 
right of action. But, in truth, the implications 
to businesses could extend beyond this. 
Robins initiated a putative class action 
against Spokeo for violating the FCRA. 
Spokeo aggregates data from phone books, 
social networks, marketing surveys, real 
estate listings, business websites, and other 
sources into an online database. The FCRA 
regulates consumer information – including 
consumer credit information – that is 
collected, disseminated, and used in 
consumer reports. Spokeo allegedly posted 
false information about Robins’ wealth, 
education, and marital status. Robins claims 
that these misrepresentations will negatively 
affect his credit, insurance and employment 
prospects. While the Ninth Circuit found that 
Robins had not suffered actual damages, it 
ultimately held that the statutory FCRA 
violation satisfied Article III’s injury-in-fact 
requirement. The Supreme Court has granted 
cert to determine “[w]hether Congress can 
create Article III standing by authorizing a 
remedy for a bare statutory violation.” 
The FCRA engenders dozens of federal class 
actions each year. That number has jumped 
since the Ninth Circuit’s decision — 29 
FCRA class actions were filed in the first four 
months of 2014. Many federal statutes 
authorize a private right of action. For 
example, internet firms interact with millions 
of individuals and are subject to numerous 
federal statutes with private rights of action. 
Facebook, eBay, Google, and Yahoo! 
expressed concern in their amicus brief that, 
under the Ninth Circuit’s holding, if any of 
these users was “willing (or enticed by a 
plaintiff’s attorney) to allege that a 
generalized practice or act violated a law 
providing a private cause of action and 
statutory damages, then she could launch a 
putative class action on behalf of herself and 
millions of other ‘similarly situated’ users . . 
. [and] pursue a multi-billion dollar statutory 
damages claim despite the lack of injury . . . 
.” 
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What do no-injury class actions mean for 
manufacturers? It could mean lawsuits based 
on “defective products” that allegedly violate 
a state or federal statute but have not caused 
any harm. For example, the food and 
beverage and cosmetic industries are often 
accused of misleading consumers through 
false advertising, labeling, and packaging. 
ConAgra was sued under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act and state consumer 
protection laws for advertising its cooking 
oils, which were made from GMOs, were 
100% natural. And Maybelline was sued  
 
 
 
under state consumer fraud and consumer 
protection acts because its “Super Stay” 
lipstick allegedly didn’t stay on the 
advertised 10-14 hours. Under Robins, 
plaintiffs in these no-injury, statutory-based 
class actions would not need to establish that 
they were physically injured to survive a 
standing challenge. Will creative plaintiff 
lawyers be able to craft an argument that 
extends the no-injury standing rule in Robins 
to non-statutory violations? 
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits permit 
statutory violations to confer standing 
whereas the Second, Fourth, and Federal 
Circuits require plaintiffs to prove an injury-
in-fact. Tune in for oral arguments this Fall.  
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association 
14-840 
Ruling Below: FERC v. Electric Power Supply, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
Electric Power Supply Association and four other energy industry associations (“Petitioners”) 
petition the court for review of a final rule by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC” or “the Commission”) governing what FERC calls “demand response resources in the 
wholesale energy market.” The rule seeks to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity 
consumption when economically efficient. Petitioners complain FERC’s new rule goes too far, 
encroaching on the states’ exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the retail market. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, ruled in favor  of Petitioners, stating that FERC had overextended its 
reach, pursuant to 16 U.S.C.S. § 824(b)(1). 
Question Presented: Whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reasonably 
concluded that it has authority under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq., to regulate 
the rules used by operators of wholesale--electricity markets to pay for reductions in electricity 
consumption and to recoup those payments through adjustments to wholesale rates. 
 
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION 
Petitioner 
v. 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
Respondent 
The United States Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on May 23, 2014 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
BROWN. Circuit Judge:  
Under the Federal Power Act (“FPA” or “the 
Act”) the Commission is generally charged 
with regulating the transmission and sale of 
electric power in interstate commerce. The 
FPA “split[s] [jurisdiction over the sale and 
delivery of electricity] between the federal 
government and the states on the basis of the 
type of service being provided and the nature 
of the energy sale.” Section 201 of the Act 
empowers FERC to regulate “the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.” Thus, “FERC’s jurisdiction over 
the sale of electricity has been specifically 
confined to the wholesale market.” 
The Commission concedes that “demand 
response is a complex matter that lies at the 
confluence of state and federal jurisdiction.” 
[Order 745]. For more than a decade, FERC 
has permitted demand-side resources to 
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participate in organized wholesale markets, 
allowing Independent System Operators 
(ISOs) and Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) to use demand-side 
resources to meet their systems’ needs for 
wholesale energy, capacity, and ancillary 
services. As this court has noted, Congress in 
2005 declared “the policy of the United 
States that time-based pricing and other 
forms of demand response . . . shall be 
encouraged . . . and unnecessary barriers to 
demand response participation in energy, 
capacity and ancillary service markets shall 
be eliminated.” The Commission has issued 
dozens of orders on demand-side resource 
participation, and ISOs and RTOs 
maintaining economic demand response 
programs could file tariffs with the 
Commission and accept bids for ancillary 
services and from aggregators of retail 
customers directly into the wholesale energy 
markets.  
Order 745 establishes uniform compensation 
levels for suppliers of demand response 
resources who participate in the “day-ahead 
and real-time energy markets.” The order 
directs ISOs and RTOs to pay those 
suppliers, including aggregators of retail 
customers, the full locational marginal price 
(LMP), or the marginal value of resources in 
each market typically used to compensate 
generators. The Commission conditioned the 
payment of full LMP on the ability of a 
demand response resource to replace a 
generation resource and required demand 
response to be cost effective. Cost 
effectiveness would be determined by a 
newly devised “net benefits test,” which 
FERC directed ISOs and RTOs to implement. 
FERC acknowledged that the cost of 
payments to retail customers to encourage 
reduced energy consumption would have to 
be subsidized by load-serving entities 
participating in the wholesale market. 
Finally, the rule allocated the costs of 
demand response payments proportionally to 
all entities that purchase from the relevant 
energy markets during times when demand 
response resources enter the market. 
Commissioner Moeller dissented, arguing the 
Commission’s retail customer compensation 
scheme conflicted both with FERC’s efforts 
to promote competitive markets and with its 
statutory mandate to ensure supplies of 
electric energy at just, reasonable, and not 
unduly preferential or discriminatory rates. 
Requests for rehearing and clarification were 
filed by ISOs, RTOs, state regulatory 
commissions, trade associations, publicly 
owned utilities, transmission owners, 
suppliers, and others. The Commission, in 
another 2–1 decision, confirmed its approach 
and Petitioners filed timely petitions for 
review. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
directs us to “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action . . . in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 
“FERC is a creature of statute” and thus “has 
no power to act unless and until Congress 
confers power upon it.” If FERC lacks 
authority under the Federal Power Act to 
promulgate a rule, its action is “plainly 
contrary to law and cannot stand.” 
We address FERC’s assertion of its statutory 
authority under the familiar Chevron 
doctrine. The question is “whether the 
statutory text forecloses the agency’s 
assertion of authority.” If, however, the 
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statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific 
issue, we must defer to the agency’s 
reasonable construction of the statute. 
FERC claims when retail consumers 
voluntarily participate in the wholesale 
market, they fall within the Commission’s 
exclusive jurisdiction to make rules for that 
market. Petitioners protest that retail sales of 
electricity are within the traditional and 
“exclusive jurisdiction of the States” and 
regulating consumption by retail electricity 
customers is a regulation of retail, not 
wholesale, activity. The problem, Petitioners 
say, is the Commission has no authority to 
draw retail customers into the wholesale 
markets by paying them not to make retail 
purchases. 
Initially, we note the regulations have a 
single definition of “demand response”—a 
“reduction in the consumption of electric 
energy by customers from their expected 
consumption in response to an increase in the 
price of electric energy or to incentive 
payments designed to induce lower 
consumption of electric energy.” High retail 
rates will reduce demand. Conversely, if 
consumers are paid to reduce demand, prices 
fall. FERC acknowledges the first case, 
“price-responsive demand” is a “retail-level” 
demand response.” In contrast, FERC dubs a 
reduction in the consumption of energy in 
response to incentive payments a “wholesale 
demand response.” The Commission draws 
this distinction between “wholesale demand 
response” and “retail demand response” in an 
attempt to narrow the logical reach of its rule. 
Demand response resources do not actually 
sell into the market. Demand response does 
not involve a sale, and the resources 
“participate” only by declining to act. 
As noted, and as the Commission concedes, 
demand response is not a wholesale sale of 
electricity; in fact, it is not a sale at all. Thus, 
FERC astutely does not rely exclusively on 
its wholesale jurisdiction under § 201(b)(1) 
for authority.  
Instead, FERC argues §§ 205 and 206 grant 
the agency authority over demand response 
resources in the wholesale market. These 
provisions task FERC with ensuring “all 
rules and regulations affecting . . . rates” in 
connection with the wholesale sale of electric 
energy are “just and reasonable.” Thus, the 
Commission argues it has jurisdiction over 
demand response because it “directly affects 
wholesale rates.”  
We agree with the Commission that demand 
response compensation affects the wholesale 
market. Because of the direct link between 
wholesale and retail markets, a change in one 
market will inevitably beget a change in the 
other. Reducing retail consumption—
through demand response payments—will 
lower the wholesale price. Demand response 
will also increase system reliability. Because 
incentive-driven demand response affects the 
wholesale market in these ways, the 
Commission argues §§ 205 and 206 are clear 
grants of agency power to promulgate Order 
745. 
The Commission’s rationale, however, has 
no limiting principle. Without boundaries, §§ 
205 and 206 could ostensibly authorize 
FERC to regulate any number of areas, 
including the steel, fuel, and labor markets. 
FERC proposes the “affecting” jurisdiction 
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can be appropriately limited to “direct 
participants” in jurisdictional wholesale 
energy markets. But, as this case 
demonstrates, the directness of participation 
may be a function of the richness of the 
incentives FERC commands. The 
commission’s authority must be cabined by 
something sturdier than creative 
characterizations. The “direct participant” 
theory also assumes FERC can “lure” non-
jurisdictional resources into the wholesale 
market in the first place to create jurisdiction, 
which is the heart of the Petitioners’ 
challenge. 
The limits of §§ 205 and 206 are best 
determined in the context of the overall 
statutory scheme. Congressional intent is 
clearly articulated in § 201’s text: FERC’s 
reach “extend[s] only to those matters which 
are not subject to regulation by the States.” 
States retain exclusive authority to regulate 
the retail market. Absent a “clear and specific 
grant of jurisdiction” elsewhere, the agency 
cannot regulate areas left to the states. The 
broad “affecting” language of §§ 205 and 206 
does not erase the specific limits of § 201.1. 
Indeed, the Commission agrees its 
jurisdiction to regulate practices “affecting” 
rates does not “trump[] the express limitation 
on its authority to regulate non-wholesale 
sales.” Otherwise, FERC could engage in 
direct regulation of the retail market 
whenever the retail market affects the 
wholesale market, which would render the 
retail market prohibition useless.  
In addition, if FERC’s arguments are 
followed to their logical conclusions, price-
responsive demand response—retail demand 
response in “FERC speak”—would also 
affect jurisdictional rates in the same way as 
the type of demand response at issue in 
FERC’s rule here, and FERC’s authority 
regarding demand response would be almost 
limitless. Although the current rule leaves 
price-responsive demand untouched, nothing 
would stop FERC from expanding this 
regulation and encroaching further on state 
authority in the future. 
Thus, FERC can regulate practices affecting 
the wholesale market under §§ 205 and 206, 
provided the Commission is not directly 
regulating a matter subject to state control, 
such as the retail market.  
The fact that the Commission is only “luring” 
the resource to enter the market instead of 
requiring entry does not undercut the force of 
Petitioners’ challenge. The lure is change of 
the retail rate. Demand response—simply 
put—is part of the retail market. It involves 
retail customers, their decision whether to 
purchase at retail, and the levels of retail 
electricity consumption. If FERC had 
directed ISOs to give a credit to any 
consumer who reduced its expected use of 
retail electricity, FERC would be directly 
regulating the retail rate. At oral argument, 
the Commission conceded crediting would be 
an impermissible intrusion into the retail 
market. Ordering an ISO to compensate a 
consumer for reducing its demand is the same 
in substance and effect as issuing a credit. 
Thus, while it is true demand response can 
occur in two ways—through a response to 
either price change or incentive payments—
nothing about the latter makes it “wholesale.” 
A buyer is a buyer, but a reduction in 
consumption cannot be a “wholesale sale.” 
FERC’s metaphysical distinction between 
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price-responsive demand and incentive-
based demand cannot solve its jurisdictional 
quandary. 
Nor does FERC’s reliance on a statement of 
congressional policy from the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 save its rule. FERC insists its 
actions “are consistent with Congressional 
policy requiring federal level facilitation of 
demand response, because this final rule is 
designed to remove barriers to demand 
response participation in the organized 
wholesale energy markets FERC’s reliance 
on this language is perplexing; if anything, 
the policy statement supports the opposite 
conclusion, that Congress intended demand 
response resources to be regulated by states, 
as part of the retail market. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 confirms the 
national policy of encouraging and 
facilitating “the deployment of [time-based 
pricing and other demand response] 
technology and devices that enable electricity 
customers to participate in such pricing and 
demand response systems . . . and 
[eliminating] unnecessary barriers to demand 
response participation in energy, capacity 
and ancillary service markets.” As an initial 
matter, even if § 1252(f) supports FERC’s 
authority, the Commission cannot rely on the 
section for an independent source of power. 
Policy statements like § 1252(f) “are just 
that—statements of policy. They are not 
delegations of regulatory authority.” Thus, 
the relevant sections of the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 can only be used to “help delineate 
the contours of statutory authority.” And 
here, those contours do not encompass 
federal regulation of demand response. 
FERC latches onto the language in § 1252(f) 
requiring elimination of “unnecessary 
barriers to demand response participation in 
energy . . . service markets” to support its 
claim that Order 745 advances congressional 
policy. In Order 745, however, FERC went 
far beyond removing barriers to demand 
response resources. Instead of simply 
“removing barriers,” the rule draws demand 
response resources into the market and then 
dictates the compensation providers of such 
resources must receive. 
We think the title of the section is 
noteworthy: “Federal Encouragement of 
Demand Response Devices.” “To encourage” 
is not “to regulate.” Although the title is “not 
dispositive of the provision’s meaning,” “it is 
not too much to expect that it has something 
to do with the subject matter” of the section. 
And here, “review of the statutory text 
reveals that [the title] has everything to do 
with the subject matter.” See id. The section 
dictates demand response is to be 
“encouraged” and “facilitated,” not directly 
regulated as Order 745 proposes. 
This is obvious when § 1252(f) is read in 
tandem with § 1252(e), “Demand Response 
and Regional Coordination,” which declares 
it the “policy of the United States to 
encourage States to coordinate, on a regional 
basis, State energy policies to provide 
reliable and affordable demand response 
services to the public.” This language 
underscores that states, not the Commission, 
regulate demand response. Indeed, § 1252(e) 
goes on to note FERC should “provide 
technical assistance to States and regional 
organizations . . . in . . . developing plans and 
programs to use demand response to respond 
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to peak demand or emergency needs.” The 
Commission is also to prepare an annual 
report, assessing demand response resources. 
Thus, the Energy Policy Act clarifies FERC’s 
authority over demand response resources is 
limited: its role is to assist and advise state 
and regional programs. 
Even more importantly, the Energy Policy 
Act statements show Congress understood 
the importance of demand response resources 
to the wholesale market—an importance 
Petitioners do not dispute. Yet, despite this 
significant impact on the wholesale market, 
Congress left regulation of this aspect of 
retail demand up to the states, rather than to 
the federal government. 
Because the Federal Power Act 
unambiguously restricts FERC from 
regulating the retail market, we need not 
reach Chevron step two. But even if we 
assumed the statute was ambiguous—as 
Judge Edwards argues, we would find 
FERC’s construction of it to be unreasonable 
for the same reasons we find the statute 
unambiguous. Because FERC’s rule entails 
direct regulation of the retail market—a 
matter exclusively within state control—it 
exceeds the Commission’s authority. 
Alternatively, even if we assume FERC had 
statutory authority to execute the Rule in the 
first place, Order 745 would still fail because 
it was arbitrary and capricious. 
Under the APA, we must set aside orders that 
are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.” In particular, “it most 
emphatically remains the duty of this court to 
ensure that an agency engage the arguments 
raised before it.” 
A review of the record reveals FERC failed 
to properly consider—and engage—
Commissioner Moeller’s reasonable (and 
persuasive) arguments, reiterating the 
concerns of Petitioners and other parties, that 
Order 745 will result in unjust and 
discriminatory rates. Moeller argued Order 
745 “overcompensat[es]” demand response 
resources because it “requires that demand 
resource[s] be paid the full LMP plus be 
allowed to retain the savings associated with 
[the provider’s] avoided retail generation 
cost.” The Commission then responded that 
demand response resources are comparable 
to generation resources and should therefore 
receive the same level of compensation. Yet 
comparable contributions cannot be the 
reason for equal compensation, when 
generation resources are incomparably 
saddled with generation costs. Nor can FERC 
justify its current overcompensation by 
pointing to past undercompensation. 
Although we need not delve now into the 
dispute among experts, the potential windfall 
to demand response resources seems 
troubling, and the Commissioner’s concerns 
are certainly valid. Indeed, 
“overcompensation cannot be just and 
reasonable,” and the Commission has not 
adequately explained how their system 
results in just compensation.  
The Commission cannot simply talk around 
the arguments raised before it; reasoned 
decisionmaking requires more: a “direct 
response,” which FERC failed to provide 
here. Thus, if FERC thinks its jurisdictional 
struggles are its only concern with Order 745, 
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it is mistaken. We would still vacate the Rule 
if we engaged the Petitioners’ substantive 
arguments. 
Ultimately, given Order 745’s direct 
regulation of the retail market, we vacate the 
rule in its entirety as ultra vires agency 
action. 
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate and 
remand the rulings under review. 
So ordered. 
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, 
dissenting:  
Under the Federal Power Act, regulatory 
authority over the nation’s electricity markets 
is bifurcated between the States and the 
federal government. In simplified terms, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC” or “Commission”) has authority 
over wholesale electricity sales but not retail 
electricity sales, with the latter solely subject 
to State regulation. The consolidated 
petitions before the court call on us to parse 
this jurisdictional line between FERC’s 
wholesale jurisdiction and the States’ retail 
jurisdiction – a line which this court and the 
Supreme Court have recognized is neither 
neat nor tidy.  
Petitioners challenge Order 745, a rule 
imposing certain compensation requirements 
on the administrators of the nation’s 
wholesale electricity markets. The rule 
requires these wholesale-market 
administrators – called Regional 
Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) and 
Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) – to 
compensate so-called “demand response 
resources” at a specified price when certain 
conditions are met. As relevant here, 
“demand response resources” are essentially 
electricity consumers, often bundled together 
by a third-party aggregator, who agree to 
reduce their electricity consumption in 
exchange for incentive payments. The pun 
scattered throughout the record is that while 
generators produce megawatts, consumers 
produce “negawatts.” In effect, Order 745 
requires that, at certain times, megawatts and 
negawatts receive the same amount of 
payment in wholesale markets, an amount 
called the “locational marginal price” or 
“LMP.” 
Although the challenged rule requires ISOs 
and RTOs to pay demand response resources 
a specified compensation (LMP), this 
requirement is applicable only when two 
conditions are met: (1) when the demand 
response resource is capable of balancing 
supply and demand in the wholesale market, 
and (2) when compensating the demand 
response resource is cost-effective under a 
“net benefits test” prescribed by the rule. The 
specific mechanics of these conditions and of 
the “net benefits test” are less important than 
what they accomplish. The critical point here 
is that, because of the specified conditions, 
Order 745 requires compensation of demand 
response resources only when their 
participation in a wholesale electricity market 
actually lowers the market-clearing price for 
wholesale electricity. 
With these basics in hand, it is easy to see 
why FERC stated in its rulemaking that 
“jurisdiction over demand response is a 
complex matter that lies at the confluence of 
state and federal jurisdiction.” On one view, 
the demand response resources subject to the 
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rule directly affect the wholesale price of 
electricity. That is, the final rule’s conditions 
operate to ensure that every negawatt of 
forgone consumption receiving 
compensation reduces both the quantity of 
electricity produced and its wholesale price. 
Focusing on this direct effect – direct, it bears 
repeating, because under the rule’s 
conditions all demand response resources 
receiving compensation reduce the market-
clearing price – it is easy to conceive of Order 
745 as permissibly falling on the wholesale 
side of the wholesale-retail jurisdictional 
line. On another view, however, the 
electricity not consumed thanks to the rule’s 
compensation payments would have been 
consumed first in a retail market. 
Focusing on the market in which the 
consumption would have occurred in the first 
instance, one can conceive of Order 745 as 
impermissibly falling on the retail side of the 
jurisdictional line. 
The task for this court, of course, is not to 
divine from first principles whether a demand 
response resource subject to Order 745 is best 
considered a matter of wholesale or retail 
electricity regulation. Rather, our task is one 
of statutory interpretation within the familiar 
Chevron framework. The Commission has 
interpreted the Federal Power Act to permit it 
to issue Order 745. And it falls to this court 
to determine whether the Act unambiguously 
“sp[eaks] to the precise question,” (Chevron 
step one), and, if not, whether the 
Commission’s interpretation is a permissible 
construction of the statute (Chevron step 
two). 
Though the rule and its operation are highly 
technical, the primary jurisdictional issue 
raised in these consolidated petitions turns on 
a rather straightforward question of statutory 
interpretation: whether a promise to forgo 
consumption of electricity that would have 
been purchased in a retail electricity market 
unambiguously constitutes a “sale of electric 
energy” under section 201(b)(1) of the 
Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). If 
so, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to 
issue Order 745 because section 201(b)(1) of 
the Act states, in relevant part, that the 
“provisions of this subchapter shall apply . . . 
to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce, but . . . shall not apply 
to any other sale of electric energy.”  
The statute, to my mind, is ambiguous 
regarding whether forgone consumption 
constitutes a “sale” under section 201(b)(1). 
Because of this ambiguity, the Act is also 
ambiguous as to whether a rule requiring 
administrators of wholesale markets to pay a 
specified level of compensation for such 
forgone consumption constitutes “direct 
regulation” of retail sales that would 
contravene the limitations of section 201. 
Because the Act is ambiguous regarding 
FERC’s authority to require ISOs and RTOs 
to pay demand response resources, we are 
obliged to defer under Chevron to the 
Commission’s permissible construction of “a 
statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope 
of the agency’s statutory authority (that is, its 
jurisdiction).”  
Absent an affirmative limitation under 
section 201, there is no doubt that demand 
response participation in wholesale markets 
and the ISOs’ and RTOs’ market rules 
concerning such participation constitute 
“practice[s] . . . affecting” wholesale rates 
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under section 206 of the Act. Petitioners’ 
arguments to the contrary ignore the direct 
effect that the ISOs’ and RTOs’ market rules 
have on wholesale electricity rates squarely 
within FERC’s jurisdiction. The Commission 
has authority to “determine the just and 
reasonable . . . practice” by setting a level of 
compensation for demand response resources 
that, in its expert judgment, will ensure that 
the rates charged in wholesale electricity 
markets are “just and reasonable.” It was 
therefore reasonable for the Commission to 
conclude that it could issue Order 745 under 
the Act’s “affecting” jurisdiction. 
In addition to challenging FERC’s 
jurisdiction, Petitioners argue that its 
decision to mandate compensation equal to 
the LMP was arbitrary and capricious. 
Petitioners believe that the LMP 
overcompensates demand response resources 
since they also realize savings from not 
having to purchase retail electricity. The 
Commission, Petitioners insist, should have 
set the compensation level at the LMP minus 
the retail cost of the forgone electricity. But 
the Commission’s decision in this regard was 
reasonable and adequately explained. 
For these reasons, explained below in greater 
detail, I respectfully dissent. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Problem 
To understand this case, one must appreciate 
the scope and significance of the problem 
FERC sought to address in Order 745. Three 
characteristics of the nation’s electricity 
market go a long way toward framing the 
problem. First, electricity, unlike most 
commodities, cannot be stored for later use. 
There must instead be a continual, 
contemporaneous matching of supply to meet 
current electricity demand. Second, not all 
power plants are created equal: some are 
efficient and cheap; others, inefficient and 
expensive. Third, most retail consumers are 
charged a fixed price for electricity that does 
not adjust in the moment to temporary spikes 
in the cost of producing electricity. 
The first two characteristics, in tandem, cause 
significant fluctuations in the cost of 
supplying electricity at different times of day. 
During periods of regular electricity 
consumption, only the efficient and cheap 
power plants need be deployed. But at hours 
of peak usage (e.g., a summer afternoon in 
Washington, D.C. when countless air 
conditioners toil against the humidity and 
heat), the suppliers of electricity must 
marshal the least efficient and most costly 
power plants to match the soaring demand for 
electricity. It is because electricity cannot be 
efficiently stored that these periods of peak 
demand must be met with new generation and 
not stockpiled supply. 
In a perfect market, or even in a well-
functioning market, the skyrocketing cost of 
producing additional electricity at hours of 
peak usage would be reflected in temporarily 
higher prices charged to consumers. In turn, 
this increased price would reduce the 
megawatts of electricity demanded, as some 
individuals and businesses would, for 
example, turn off their air conditioners to 
save money. The market would thereby reach 
an efficient equilibrium. 
But here is where the third characteristic of 
electricity markets comes in. Retail 
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electricity prices are generally regulated to 
remain constant over longer periods of time. 
That is, consumers do not pay different 
amounts during different hours of the day, 
notwithstanding the sharply vacillating cost 
of producing electricity. Electricity demand 
thus does not respond to time-sensitive price 
signals. As a result, there are times when 
people and businesses consume electricity 
that costs more to produce than it is worth to 
them to consume. This is inefficient. 
Wholesale electricity markets, which are 
under FERC’s jurisdiction, suffer the same 
inefficiency. Since retail demand is not price-
responsive, the aggregate amount of 
electricity demanded in the wholesale market 
by the entities that serve retail customers is 
also uncoupled from the time-specific price 
of supplying electricity. In economic terms, 
the demand for electricity in the wholesale 
market is inelastic.  
The Commission recognizes the problem. As 
it observed in its order denying requests for 
rehearing of Order 745, 
[a] properly functioning market 
should reflect both the willingness of 
sellers to sell at a price and the 
willingness of buyers to purchase at a 
price. In an RTO- or ISO-run market, 
however, buyers are generally unable 
to directly express their willingness to 
pay for a product at the price offered. 
As discussed later, RTOs and ISOs 
cannot isolate individual buyers’ 
willingness to pay which results in 
extremely inelastic demand. 
B. FERC’s Solution 
Having identified a problem in the wholesale 
electricity market, the Commission has a 
statutory obligation to do what it can to fix it. 
That is because FERC is charged under the 
Federal Power Act with ensuring that 
wholesale electricity rates are “just and 
reasonable.” It must ensure that all “rates and 
charges made, demanded, or received by any 
public utility for or in connection with the . . 
. sale of electric energy subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission” are “just and 
reasonable.” And when FERC determines 
that a “practice . . . affecting” such a rate is 
unjust or unreasonable, it must itself 
determine and fix “the just and reasonable . . 
. practice . . . to be thereafter observed.” 
Consistent with its statutory duty and in view 
of the market distortions caused by inelastic 
wholesale demand, the Commission has 
initiated a series of reforms to open wholesale 
markets to “demand response resources.” For 
our purposes, “demand response resources” 
are resources that are capable of reducing 
“the consumption of electric energy by 
customers from their expected consumption 
in response . . . to incentive payments 
designed to induce lower consumption of 
electric energy.” Put simply, demand 
response resources agree not to purchase 
electricity in exchange for payment. 
The basic premise of FERC’s demand-
response reforms is that there are two ways 
that wholesale-market administrators (i.e., 
ISOs and RTOs) can balance wholesale 
supply and demand: by increasing the supply 
of electricity or by decreasing the demand for 
it. An ISO or RTO reduces wholesale 
demand when it pays a demand response 
resource because that resource will forgo 
electricity consumption in the retail market, 
which, in turn, will lead to fewer megawatts 
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of electricity being demanded in the 
aggregate in that ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale 
market. At certain times (e.g., summer 
afternoons in Washington, D.C.), paying 
incentive payments to induce consumers not 
to consume electricity may be cheaper than 
paying generators to produce more power; 
negawatts, in such circumstances, are the 
cheaper alternative. And because, 
functionally, there is little difference to 
wholesale-market administrators between a 
megawatt and a negawatt (both assist equally 
in the administrator’s task of bringing 
wholesale demand and supply into 
equipoise), demand response resources are 
capable of competing directly with traditional 
generation resources so long as the 
appropriate market rules are in place. 
For some years now, FERC has recognized 
that the direct participation of demand 
response resources in wholesale markets 
improves the functioning of these markets in 
several respects. First, it lowers wholesale 
prices because “lower demand means a lower 
wholesale price.” Second, it mitigates the 
market power of suppliers of electricity 
because they have to compete with demand 
response resources and adjust their bidding 
strategy accordingly. Third, demand 
response “enhances system reliability,” for 
example, by “reducing electricity demand at 
critical times (e.g., when a generator or a 
transmission line unexpectedly fails).”  
The benefits of demand response 
participating in wholesale markets are 
beyond reproach. Commissioner Moeller, 
who dissented in Order 745, put it best: 
While the merits of various methods 
for compensating demand response 
were discussed at length in the course 
of this rulemaking, nowhere did I 
review any comment or hear any 
testimony that questioned the benefit 
of having demand response resources 
participate in the organized wholesale 
energy markets. On this point, there is 
no debate. The fact is that demand 
response plays a very important role 
in these markets by providing 
significant economic, reliability, and 
other market-related benefits. 
It is no surprise, then, that FERC has initiated 
a series of reforms to open up its markets to 
demand response, on the theory that doing so 
helps to ensure “just and reasonable” 
wholesale rates by improving how these 
markets function in the three ways just 
mentioned.  
In particular, in Order 719 FERC required 
ISOs and RTOs to “accept bids from demand 
response resources in RTOs’ and ISOs’ 
markets for certain ancillary services on a 
basis comparable to other resources” and, in 
certain circumstances, to “permit an 
aggregator of retail customers . . . to bid 
demand response on behalf of retail 
customers directly into the organized energy 
market.” But FERC placed an important 
condition on this requirement; ISOs and 
RTOs were required to accept bids from 
demand response “unless not permitted by 
the laws or regulations of the relevant electric 
retail regulatory authority.” Finally, 
recognizing that “further reforms may be 
necessary to eliminate barriers to demand 
response in the future,” FERC further ordered 
ISOs and RTOs to “assess and report on any 
remaining barriers to comparable treatment 
of demand response resources that are within 
the Commission’s jurisdiction.” 
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And further reforms were indeed necessary. 
Prior to issuing Order 745, ISOs and RTOs 
had differing practices concerning the level 
of compensation to be paid to demand 
response resources in their markets. The 
Commission found that many ISOs and 
RTOs undercompensated demand response 
resources in certain circumstances. It reached 
this finding in light of existing barriers to 
demand response participation in wholesale 
markets, including “the lack of market 
incentives to invest in enabling technologies 
that would allow electric customers and 
aggregators of retail customers to see and 
respond to changes in marginal costs of 
providing electric service as those costs 
change.”  
Order 745 sought to correct the 
undercompensation problem by mandating 
that ISOs and RTOs pay demand response 
resources the same market price that they pay 
to generators, i.e., LMP. But it limited this 
compensation requirement to circumstances 
where two specific conditions are met. LMP-
compensation would be required only when 
(1) “the demand response resource [is] able 
to displace a generation resource in a manner 
that serves the RTO or ISO in balancing 
supply and demand,” and (2) “the payment of 
LMP . . . [is] cost-effective, as determined by 
[a] net benefits test.”  
FERC understood that it had authority to 
correct the undercompensation problem 
because, in the absence of adequate 
compensation, too few demand response 
resources affirmatively bid into the wholesale 
markets. And such participation is necessary 
for the market to function rationally and 
reach “just and reasonable” rates. As FERC 
stated: 
We find, based on the record here 
that, when a demand response 
resource has the capability to balance 
supply and demand as an alternative 
to a generation resource, and when . . 
. paying LMP to that demand 
response resource is shown to be cost-
effective as determined by the net 
benefits test described herein, 
payment by an RTO or ISO of 
compensation other than the LMP is 
unjust and unreasonable. When these 
conditions are met, we find that 
payment of LMP to these resources 
will result in just and reasonable rates 
for ratepayers. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Jurisdiction 
Petitioners argue that Order 745 is “in 
excess” of FERC’s “statutory jurisdiction.” 
We evaluate this contention under Chevron 
and defer to FERC’s permissible construction 
of its authorizing statute, regardless of 
“whether the interpretive question presented 
is ‘jurisdictional.’” The proper question is 
thus whether the Act unambiguously 
forecloses FERC from issuing Order 745 
under its “affecting” jurisdiction.  
FERC’s explanation of its jurisdiction under 
the Federal Power Act is straightforward and 
sensible. FERC has the authority and 
responsibility to correct any “practice . . . 
affecting” wholesale electricity rates that the 
Commission determines to be “unjust” or 
“unreasonable.” In its view, the ISOs’ and 
RTOs’ rules governing the participation of 
demand response resources in the nation’s 
wholesale electricity markets are “practices 
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affecting [wholesale electricity] rates.” That 
is, an ISO’s or RTO’s market rules governing 
how a demand response resource may 
compete in its wholesale market, including 
the terms by which a demand response 
resource is to be compensated in the market, 
are “practices affecting” that wholesale 
market’s rates for electricity. And FERC has 
determined that an ISO’s or RTO’s 
“practice” is unjust and unreasonable to the 
degree that it inadequately compensates 
demand response resources capable of 
supplanting more expensive generation 
resources. As explained above, FERC has 
found that demand response improves the 
functioning of wholesale markets by (1) 
lowering the wholesale price of electricity, 
(2) exerting downward pressure on 
generators’ market power, and (3) enhancing 
system reliability. 
FERC’s explanation is consistent with our 
case law. In Connecticut, we considered 
whether FERC has jurisdiction to review an 
ISO’s capacity charges. Capacity is not 
electricity but the ability to produce it when 
needed, and in Connecticut the ISO had 
established a market where capacity 
providers – generators, prospective 
generators, and demand response resources – 
competitively bid to meet the ISO’s capacity 
needs three years in the future. Generation, 
like retail sales, is expressly the domain of 
State regulation under section 201, and the 
petitioners argued that by increasing the 
overall capacity requirement the ISO was 
improperly requiring the installation of new 
generation resources. We disagreed and held 
that FERC had “affecting” jurisdiction under 
section 206 because “capacity decisions . . . 
affect FERC-jurisdictional transmission rates 
for that system without directly implicating 
generation facilities.” That the capacity 
requirement helped to “find the right price” 
was enough of an effect to satisfy section 
206. 
Petitioners’ specific arguments against 
FERC’s exercising jurisdiction are 
unpersuasive. First, Petitioners note that 
section 201 of the Act establishes a clear 
jurisdictional line between “the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce,” which is properly the subject of 
FERC’s jurisdiction, and “any other sale of 
electric energy.” According to Petitioners, 
the Commission has transgressed this line 
because it “has ordered ISOs and RTOs to 
pay retail customers for reducing their retail 
purchases of electricity.” 
But this argument mischaracterizes the rule 
and papers over a key ambiguity. First, the 
mischaracterization: Petitioners are wrong 
inasmuch as they imply that FERC requires 
all ISOs and RTOs to pay demand response 
resources a minimum level of compensation 
(LMP). The compensation requirement 
promulgated in Order 745 does not apply 
unless an ISO or RTO “has a tariff provision 
permitting demand response resources to 
participate as a resource in the energy 
market.” And the regulation’s requirement 
that ISOs and RTOs accept bids from demand 
response resources comes with a key caveat: 
the requirement applies “unless not permitted 
by the laws or regulations of the relevant 
electric retail regulatory authority.” In other 
words, there is a carve-out from the 
compensation requirement for ISOs and 
RTOs in States where local regulatory law 
stands in the way. Thus, the Order preserves 
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State regulation of retail markets. This is 
hardly the stuff of grand agency overreach. 
More fundamentally, Petitioners’ argument 
founders on a statutory ambiguity they 
ignore. Section 201 makes clear that FERC 
may regulate “the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce” but not 
“any other sale of electric energy.” (emphasis 
added). The demand response at issue here is 
forgone consumption, which is no “sale” at 
all. Perhaps the phrase “any other sale of 
electric energy” could be interpreted to 
include non-sales that would have been sales 
in the retail market, but it certainly does not 
require such a reading. It is reasonable to 
categorize demand response as neither a 
retail sale nor wholesale sale under the 
Federal Power Act. And on this 
understanding, section 201 “says nothing 
about” FERC’s power to review 
compensation rates for demand response in 
wholesale electricity markets. 
Nor is Petitioners’ argument under section 
201 made any stronger by reference to 
subsection (a). This prefatory subsection 
states that while “Federal regulation . . . of 
electric energy in interstate commerce and 
the sale of such energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce is necessary in the 
public interest,” federal regulation should 
“extend only to those matters which are not 
subject to regulation by the States.” But the 
Supreme Court has made clear that “the 
precise reserved state powers language in § 
201(a)” is a “mere policy declaration that 
cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of 
jurisdiction, even if the particular grant 
seems inconsistent with the broadly 
expressed purpose.”  
The most that can be said of section 201 is 
that it commits regulation of retail sales to the 
States and regulation of wholesale sales to 
the Commission. And while it is true that the 
forgone consumption would have been 
purchased in the first instance in the retail 
market, it does not follow from this fact that 
non-consumption constitutes an “other sale” 
under section 201(b). There was no sale, 
period. And the statute does not give a clear 
indication that Congress intended to 
foreclose FERC from regulating non-sales 
that have a direct effect on the wholesale 
markets under FERC’s jurisdiction. 
Even assuming that the Federal Power Act 
requires demand response resources to be 
considered inextricably part of retail “sales” 
subject solely to State regulation, Order 745 
does not engage in the type of “direct 
regulation” that would violate section 201. 
Order 745 does not require anything of retail 
electricity consumers and leaves it to the 
States to decide whether to permit demand 
response. All Order 745 says is that if a 
State’s laws permit demand response to be 
bid into electricity markets, and if a demand 
response resource affirmatively decides to 
participate in an ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale 
electricity market, and if that demand 
response resource would in a particular 
circumstance allow the ISO or RTO to 
balance wholesale supply and demand, and if 
paying that demand resource would be a net 
benefit to the system, then the ISO or RTO 
must pay that resource the LMP. That is it. 
This requirement will no doubt affect how 
much electricity is consumed by a small 
subset of retail consumers who elect to 
participate as demand response resources in 
wholesale markets. But that fact does not 
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render Order 745 “direct regulation” of the 
retail market. Authority over retail rates and 
over whether to permit demand response 
remains vested solely in the States. 
In this respect, Order 745 is similar to the 
capacity rule in Connecticut that we found 
did not directly regulate generation facilities. 
Even though increasing the capacity 
requirement incentivized the procurement of 
additional resources, including new 
generation facilities, to meet the higher 
requirement, we recognized that States 
retained their ultimate authority over the 
construction of new generation facilities. 
And because the capacity requirements could 
be met in other ways aside from building new 
generators (e.g., through demand response or 
capacity contracts), it was irrelevant that 
“public utilities . . . overwhelmingly 
responded to [increased capacity 
requirements] by choosing to allow 
construction of new facilities over other 
alternatives.” The lesson of Connecticut is 
that FERC can indirectly incentivize action 
that it cannot directly require so long as it is 
otherwise acting within its jurisdiction – and 
that doing so does not constitute 
impermissible direct regulation of an area 
reserved to the States. So too here: Order 745 
may encourage more demand response, but 
States retain the ultimate authority to approve 
the practice. 
Second, Petitioners argue that the FERC’s 
“affecting” jurisdiction under sections 205 
and 206 of the Act “does not extend so far as 
to allow the Commission to regulate directly 
the retail services that are expressly carved 
out from the scope of its jurisdiction.” To a 
large degree, this argument simply rehashes 
Petitioners’ erroneous reading of section 201 
and fails for the reasons just described. 
Demand response resources are promises to 
forgo consumption of electricity and 
therefore are not retail “sales.” This is not 
changed by the fact that forgone consumption 
would have taken place in the first instance in 
a retail market. Because of this, the 
Commission’s asserting “affecting” 
jurisdiction over demand response does not, 
as Petitioners suggest, “nullify[]” a limitation 
set forth in section 201. 
To be sure, section 206 cannot be read to 
displace unambiguous jurisdictional limits 
imposed by section 201(b). Suppose, for 
example, that FERC issued a rule requiring 
ISOs and RTOs to condition all wholesale 
sales of electricity on load-serving entities’ 
agreeing to charge retail customers with real-
time pricing that adjusted hourly for 
variations in the cost of producing electricity. 
Such a rule would unambiguously regulate 
each retail “sale” because it would mandate a 
particular form of compensation for actual – 
not counterfactual – retail sales. Thus, while 
price-responsive retail pricing would no 
doubt “affect” the wholesale rate, FERC 
could not claim jurisdiction under sections 
205 and 206 because the subchapter which 
includes these sections “shall not apply to any 
other sale of electric energy.” This example 
plainly differs from the present case because 
demand response resources are forgone sales 
or non-sales, and therefore it is at best 
ambiguous whether the limitation in section 
201(b) applies.  
To bolster their case, Petitioners invoke the 
specter of limitless federal authority if FERC 
is permitted to exercise “affecting” 
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jurisdiction to issue Order 745. They caution 
that “the Commission’s expansive 
interpretation of its ‘affecting’ jurisdiction 
would allow it to regulate any number of 
activities – such as the purchase or sale of 
steel, fuel, labor, and other inputs influencing 
the cost to generate or transmit electricity – 
merely by redefining the activities as 
‘practices’ that affect wholesale rates.” 
This argument cannot carry the day because 
it ignores at least two important limits. It first 
ignores section 201’s limit proscribing any 
“direct regulation” of retail sales (which 
would bar the hypothetical rule, discussed 
above, in which FERC tries to mandate that 
retail sales have dynamic, time-responsive 
pricing). It also ignores the limitations we 
announced in CAISO. There, we held that 
FERC exceeded its jurisdiction when it 
replaced the board members of an ISO on the 
theory that the composition of the ISO’s 
board was a “practice . . . affecting [a] rate” 
under section 206(a). We held that “section 
206’s empowering of the Commission to 
assess the justness and reasonableness of 
practices affecting rates of electric utilities is 
limited to those methods or ways of doing 
things on the part of the utility that directly 
affect the rate or are closely related to the rate, 
not all those remote things beyond the rate 
structure that might in some sense indirectly 
or ultimately do so.” 
These limits foreclose the parade of horribles 
marshaled by Petitioners. Like replacing the 
ISO’s board of directors in CAISO, FERC 
could not, consistent with Circuit precedent, 
regulate markets in steel, fuel, labor, and 
other inputs for generating electricity, which 
constitute “remote things beyond the rate 
structure that might in some sense indirectly 
or ultimately” affect the wholesale rate of 
electricity.  
Order 745 passes the CAISO test quite 
comfortably because the demand response 
resources subject to the rule have a 
quintessentially “direct” effect on wholesale 
rates. The rule’s compensation requirement 
applies only when an ISO or RTO can use the 
demand response resource in lieu of a 
generation resource to balance supply and 
demand, and only when paying a demand 
response resource is cost-effective under the 
rule’s net benefits test. Order 745 thus does 
not purport to regulate demand response writ 
large; its compensation requirement applies 
only when the demand response by definition 
alters the wholesale electricity price. That is 
about as “direct” an effect and as clear a 
“nexus” with the wholesale transaction as can 
be imagined. There can be little doubt that 
FERC has the authority to review the justness 
and reasonableness of rates that are so closely 
connected with the healthy functioning of its 
jurisdictional markets; this, as we said in 
Connecticut, is the “heartland of the 
Commission’s section 206 jurisdiction.” 
Third, Petitioners argue that the 
Commission’s orders exceed its jurisdiction 
because “they unreasonably interfere with 
existing state and local programs addressing 
retail customer ‘demand response.’” Any 
such effect, however, is merely incidental. As 
the Commission correctly observed, Order 
745 “does not directly affect retail-level 
demand response programs, nor does it 
require that demand response resources offer 
into the wholesale market only. Indeed, the 
organized wholesale energy markets can and 
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do operate simultaneously with retail-level 
programs . . . .” FERC’s reforms in Order 745 
run on a parallel track with State-level 
reforms. And to the degree that FERC’s 
reforms incidentally affect parallel State-
level initiatives, that does not render FERC’s 
actions improper.  
* * * 
To summarize: FERC’s jurisdiction turns on 
two issues: (1) whether demand response is a 
retail “sale” or is otherwise unambiguously 
committed to State regulation under the 
Federal Power Act, and (2) whether sections 
205 and 206 clearly grant jurisdiction to 
FERC to regulate how wholesale-market 
administrators compensate demand response 
resources that “directly affect” wholesale 
prices. Unless we inject quasi-philosophy 
into our Chevron analysis (what is the sound 
of one hand clapping? what is the true nature 
of a sale that was never made? of megawatts 
never consumed?), I think it clear that the 
Federal Power Act does not precisely address 
the first question; forgone consumption is not 
unambiguously a “sale,” nor does the statute 
dictate that demand response be treated 
solely as a matter of retail regulation. And the 
second question is resolved, in my view, by 
the terms of Order 745 which narrowly apply 
only to demand response resources that by 
definition directly affect the wholesale rates 
of electricity. This falls squarely within the 
Commission’s “affecting” jurisdiction. The 
proper course for this court is to defer to the 
Commission’s well-reasoned and 
permissible interpretation of its authority 
under the statute. 
B. Level of Compensation 
Petitioners also argue that Order 745 is 
arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A). In reviewing such claims, we 
consider whether FERC “examine[d] the 
relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.” We also afford significant 
deference to FERC in light of the highly 
technical regulatory landscape that is its 
purview. Indeed, “the Commission enjoys 
broad discretion to invoke its expertise in 
balancing competing interests and drawing 
administrative lines.” And we “afford great 
deference to the Commission” in cases 
involving ratemaking decisions as the 
“statutory requirement that rates be ‘just and 
reasonable’ is obviously incapable of precise 
judicial definition.” Finally, to the extent that 
the Commission bases its actions on factual 
findings, such findings are conclusive if 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Petitioners’ chief complaint is that Order 745 
sets the required compensation level for 
demand response at the LMP (recall: 
locational marginal price). LMP equals “the 
marginal value of an increase in supply or a 
reduction in consumption at each node 
within” an ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale market, 
and is the compensation generation resources 
generally receive. Petitioners complain that 
demand response resources already get the 
benefit of the forgone expense of retail 
electricity (abbreviated in the record as “G”). 
Therefore, Petitioners contend that, under 
FERC’s rule, demand response resources 
effectively receive a “double payment”: LMP 
plus G. Br. of Pet’rs at 47. According to 
Petitioners, requiring LMP compensation 
thus results in unjust and discriminatory 
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overcompensation of demand response 
resources.  
It is of course true, as the majority observes, 
that FERC is “bounded by the requirements 
of reasoned decisionmaking.” Therefore, 
FERC was required to provide a “direct 
response” to the Petitioners’ and the 
dissenting Commissioner’s concerns about 
overcompensation. This is precisely what the 
Commission did in carefully explaining how 
Order 745’s setting compensation at the LMP 
was neither discriminatory nor unjust. 
To begin with, FERC provided a thorough 
explanation for why compensating demand 
response at the LMP (and not LMP - G) was 
neither unjust nor over-compensatory. It 
explained that such compensation was 
necessary to encourage an adequate level of 
demand response participation in wholesale 
markets in light of existing market barriers. 
That last part – the market barriers – is the 
key. The Commission has identified 
numerous barriers preventing adequate 
participation of demand response in 
wholesale markets. Indeed, citing record 
evidence, the Commission explained that 
“the inadequate compensation mechanisms 
in place today in wholesale energy markets 
fail to induce sufficient investment in 
demand response resource infrastructure and 
expertise that could lead to adequate levels of 
demand response procurement.” FERC 
further explained that “a lack of incentives to 
invest in enabling technologies can be 
addressed by making additional investment 
resources available to market participants” 
and that paying LMP “to demand response 
will provide the proper level of investment 
resources available for capital 
improvements.” In view of these barriers, and 
the value of demand response participation to 
ensuring “just and reasonable” wholesale 
rates, the Commission concluded that LMP 
was the appropriate level of compensation. 
FERC sums it up well: 
The Commission acknowledged that 
noted experts differed on whether 
paying LMP in the current 
circumstances facing the wholesale 
electric market is a reasonable price. 
In determining that LMP is the just 
and reasonable price to pay for 
demand response, the Commission 
examined some of the previously 
recognized barriers to demand 
response that exist in current 
wholesale markets. These barriers 
create an inelastic demand curve in 
the wholesale energy market that 
results in higher wholesale prices than 
would be observed if the demand side 
of the market were fully developed. 
The Commission found that paying 
LMP when cost-effective may help 
remove these barriers to entry of 
potential demand response resources, 
and, thereby, help move prices closer 
to the levels that would result if all 
demand could respond to the 
marginal price of energy. 
With respect to the argument that utilizing the 
LMP is somehow discriminatory because 
incomparable resources are paid comparable 
amounts, the Commission offered reasonable 
grounds for treating demand response as 
comparable to generation resources. The 
Commission observed that, from the 
perspective of an ISO or RTO, a demand 
response resource was comparable to a 
generation resource inasmuch as demand 
response is equally capable of balancing 
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wholesale supply and demand. This is not the 
sum total of the explanation, however. In the 
same section of its order, the Commission 
explained that “examining cost avoidance by 
demand response resources is not consistent 
with the treatment of generation. In the 
absence of market power concerns, the 
Commission generally does not examine 
each of the costs of production for individual 
resources participating as supply resources in 
the organized wholesale electricity markets.” 
FERC continued: “we note that certain 
generators may receive benefits or savings in 
the form of credits or in other forms. In these 
cases, the generators realize a value of LMP 
plus the credit or savings, but ISOs or RTOs 
do not take such benefits or savings into 
account in determining how much to pay 
those resources.” The point is that the 
comparability of compensation is assessed 
without regard to outside costs and credits; 
just as two generators are both compensated 
at the LMP even though only one might be 
receiving a tax credit for producing energy, 
so too with comparing demand response 
resources to generation resources. This was 
clearly explained, and it is reasonable. 
This court has no business second-guessing 
the Commission’s judgment on the level of 
compensation.  
Whatever policy disagreements one might 
have with Order 745’s decision to 
compensate demand response resources at 
the LMP (and there are legitimate 
disagreements to be had), the rule does not 
fail for want of reasoned decisionmaking. 
FERC’s judgment is owed deference because 
it has put forth a reasonable multi-step 
explanation of its decision to mandate LMP 
compensation. First, responsive demand is a 
necessary component of a well-functioning 
wholesale market, and FERC understood that 
its obligation to ensure just and reasonable 
rates required it to facilitate an adequate level 
of demand response participation in its 
jurisdictional markets. Second, FERC 
concluded that market barriers were 
inhibiting an adequate level of demand 
response participation. Third, FERC 
concluded that mandating LMP would 
provide the proper incentives for demand 
response resources to overcome these 
barriers to participation in the wholesale 
market.  
III. CONCLUSION 
FERC had jurisdiction to issue Order 745 
because demand response is not 
unambiguously a matter of retail regulation 
under the Federal Power Act, and because the 
demand response resources subject to the rule 
directly affect wholesale electricity prices. 
And the Commission’s decision to require 
compensation equal to the LMP, rather than 
LMP - G, was not arbitrary or capricious. The 
majority disagrees on both points. The 
unfortunate consequence is that a promising 
rule of national significance – promulgated 
by the agency that has been authorized by 
Congress to address the matters in issue – is 
laid aside on grounds that I think are 
inconsistent with the statute, at odds with 
applicable precedent, and impossible to 
square with our limited scope of review. I 
therefore respectfully dissent.
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“Supreme Court to Rule on Breaks for Cutting Peak-Demand 
Energy Use” 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes & Chris Mooney 
May 4, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court announced Monday that 
it will review whether a federal agency may 
require electric market operators to 
compensate customers who lower their 
consumption of electricity during peak 
demand hours. 
 
The court said it would determine whether 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) exceeded its statutory authority 
when in 2011 it adopted the approach, which 
is called “demand response.” 
 
Environmentalists, the Obama administration 
and some large consumers say demand 
response is a key mechanism for getting 
people to use less energy overall and, 
therefore, producing fewer emissions of 
carbon dioxide or other harmful pollutants. 
 
Total electricity demand varies greatly, and 
when it peaks — usually in the afternoon or 
evening each day, but also seasonally, such 
as on very hot days — power companies have 
to bring additional power plants online to 
service that peak load. 
 
In doing so, the companies address the need 
for more electricity by adding more supply. 
But demand response also can reduce how 
much power people or companies use during 
these peak times. 
 
FERC’s rule would have ensured that 
companies or individuals get compensated 
for voluntarily reducing their power usage at 
peak demand. “A market functions 
effectively only when both supply and 
demand can meaningfully participate,” 
FERC noted in promulgating the rule. 
 
The agency also said in its brief to the 
Supreme Court, “Demand response, by 
decreasing the amount of power necessary to 
balance supply and demand, reduces the risk 
of system failures like blackouts and curbs 
the market power of generators.” 
 
Electricity generators say that FERC’s 
proposed compensation is too generous and, 
more importantly, is a power grab that 
exceeds the authority Congress has given it. 
 
“The Federal Power Act draws a ‘bright line’ 
distinction between state and federal 
jurisdiction over the regulation of sales of 
electric power,” said a brief filed by the 
Electric Power Supply Association, of which 
NRG Energy and Exelon Corp. are members. 
 
Wholesale sales of electricity are subject to 
FERC’s jurisdiction, the association asserts, 
while retail sales are the exclusive province 
of the states. 
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A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the 
electricity producers on a 2-to-1 vote. 
 
“Demand response — simply put — is part of 
the retail market,” wrote Circuit Judge Janice 
Rogers Brown. “It involves retail customers, 
their decision whether to purchase at retail, 
and the levels of retail electricity 
consumption.” 
 
The Obama administration, supported by 
environmentalists and some large consumers, 
asked the Supreme Court to reconsider. 
 
“To the extent demand response reduces 
prices, which we believe it does, all 
consumers benefit,” says Steven Nadel, 
executive director of the American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy. 
 
A supporting brief filed by a group of large 
power consumers, including Alcoa and the 
University of Maryland at College Park, said 
that the benefits extend beyond those who 
take advantage of the program. 
 
“Demand response benefits all end-use 
consumers by eventually reducing their 
electricity prices by billions of dollars per 
year,” the brief said. “It also provides a 
reliable and effective mechanism for 
balancing the grid when demand spikes.” 
 
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. recused himself 
from the case, presumably because of a 
financial conflict. That means the case will be 
heard by an eight-member court in the term 
that begins in October, and a tie vote would 
keep the lower court’s ruling in place. 
 
The combined cases are FERC v. Electric 
Power Supply Association and EnerNOC v. 
Electric Power Supply Association.  
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 “FERC Gets Top U.S. Court Hearing on Energy-Conservation Rule” 
Bloomberg 
Greg Stohr & Jonathan Crawford 
May 4, 2015 
 
The Obama administration will get a U.S. 
Supreme Court hearing as it tries to save a 
rule that rewards industrial consumers for 
cutting electricity use. 
 
The rule, opposed by the power industry, 
benefits smart-grid companies such as 
EnerNOC Inc. that help large electricity 
consumers reduce their power usage during 
peak-demand hours. It’s also backed by large 
power consumers, including Alcoa Inc. and 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., that are eyeing 
millions of dollars in energy savings. 
 
A federal appeals court said the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission lacked 
authority to issue the rule. It requires 
wholesale-market operators to pay electricity 
users that cut consumption during high-
demand periods at the same rate as generators 
that produce power. The practice, known as 
“demand response,” means stiffer 
competition for generators. 
 
“It’s going to lead to a fair amount of 
uncertainty for quite some time,” William 
Scherman, a former FERC general counsel 
who now leads the energy, regulation and 
litigation practice at Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher LLP in Washington, said Monday 
by phone. 
 
The court will consider the case in the nine-
month term that starts in October, with 
arguments likely in November or December, 
and a decision by June 2016. FERC’s 
payment rule remains in effect. 
 
Rejection of the rule would widen profits for 
NRG Energy Inc., FirstEnergy Corp., Exelon 
Corp., Dynegy Inc. and American Electric 
Power Co., the companies with the most 
wholesale electricity sales in PJM 
Interconnection LLC’s mid-Atlantic grid, 
Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Kit Konolige 
wrote in a note to clients Monday. 
 
Mid-Atlantic Grid 
 
The 13-state grid, which has the highest 
amount of demand response of all the 
regional markets, paid $17.7 million for 
consumers to cut their electricity use in 2014, 
according to Monitoring Analytics LLC, 
based in Eagleville, Pennsylvania, which 
oversees the market. 
 
Advocates of demand response say it can cut 
air pollution and reduce the need to build 
additional power plants. Demand response 
helped the grid maintain reliable service 
when the system faced potential supply 
shortages during the Polar Vortex in January 
2014, according to PJM. 
 
“It’s a great day for demand response and 
consumers across the country,” Frank Lacey, 
a vice president at Comverge Inc., a demand-
response company based in Norcross, 
Georgia, said in a phone interview. “We 
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believe the court will hold that demand 
response is rightfully within the jurisdiction 
of FERC and consumers will continue to save 
billions of dollars annually because of the 
decision.” 
 
Power plant owners that opposed the FERC 
plan say it is too generous to energy 
consumers. 
 
FERC’s Authority 
 
The court fight centers on the reach of 
FERC’s authority. Federal law lets the 
commission regulate rates only at the 
wholesale level, leaving retail regulation in 
the hands of the states. 
 
FERC and the Obama administration contend 
that the rule applies only to wholesale rates 
and to demand-response providers that are 
participating in that market. A divided federal 
appeals court in Washington rejected that 
reasoning, saying that demand response by 
definition “involves retail customers, their 
decision whether to purchase at retail and the 
levels of retail electricity consumption.” 
 
That appeals court decision was poised to 
take effect and void the rule had the Supreme 
Court not intervened. 
 
Alito Recusal 
 
Justice Samuel Alito didn’t participate in the 
court’s action today. As is customary, Alito 
gave no reasons, though his most recent 
financial-disclosure form indicated he owned 
at least $100,000 of OGE Energy Corp., a 
wholesale power company based in 
Oklahoma City. 
 
Assuming Alito doesn’t take part in the case, 
the administration will have to win the votes 
of five of the other eight justices to save the 
rule. 
 
PJM said Monday it will include demand 
response in a power-capacity auction, 
expected to take place by August. 
 
The auction will cover the 12 months starting 
in June 2018. Capacity auctions are intended 
to give power-plant owners an incentive to 
have their generators ready to run when 
needed. Aggregators of demand response 
also can be paid for assuring that customers 
are ready to shut down equipment or lights, 
reducing the need for plants to run. 
 
“The demand response case being reviewed 
by the Supreme Court involves the energy 
market specifically. If the court applies the 
decision also to the capacity markets, as the 
generators have asked, as much as $100 
million of annual net income would be at 
stake for Exelon,” Konolige said. 
 
The high court also will consider whether the 
appeals court was right to say FERC didn’t 
adequately weigh whether the rule will lead 
to unjust rates. 
 
The Supreme Court also will hear a related 
appeal filed by companies including 
EnerNOC and Johnson Controls Inc.’s 
EnergyConnect unit. 
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The cases are FERC v. Electric Power Supply 
Association, 14-840, and EnerNOC v. 
Electric Power Supply Association, 14-841. 
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“Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC” 
Harvard Law Review 
March 10, 2015 
 
The Federal Power Act splits jurisdiction 
over the electricity system between the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), which regulates the wholesale 
market and transmission, and state regulators, 
which have authority over retail markets. 
However, the seeming clarity of this 
jurisdictional divide has been muddied by the 
recent advent of “demand response,” in 
which consumers are paid for reducing their 
energy consumption. Recently, in Electric 
Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC (EPSA), the 
D.C. Circuit vacated a FERC order that 
attempted to regulate the wholesale prices 
paid for demand response, on the basis that 
the order was beyond FERC’s jurisdiction 
due to its impermissible effect on retail 
markets. The breadth of the court’s holding 
risks confusion in the energy markets and 
unnecessarily limits FERC’s regulatory 
options. 
 
Demand response offers a partial solution to 
inefficiencies in the electricity market. The 
typical organizational model for the 
electricity market makes a division between 
wholesale and retail sectors. The regional 
systems relevant to this case are run by 
“system operators,” independent entities 
responsible for ensuring that energy supplied 
in the system’s wholesale market meets the 
demand in the system’s retail market. 
Because the demand for electricity is not 
constant, at times of high demand system 
operators must buy power at high prices from 
less efficient generators. Due to the 
unresponsive nature of retail prices, 
consumers have little incentive to reduce 
consumption during these peak-demand 
periods. Demand response offers a partial 
solution. At times of peak consumption, 
system operators can reduce the overall cost 
of electricity in the system by paying 
consumers or groups of consumers, dubbed 
“demand response resources” (DRRs), to 
reduce their energy consumption. 
 
FERC’s Order 745 attempted to address 
perceived problems with the compensation of 
demand response in the wholesale market. 
Though FERC had previously issued orders 
governing the structure of this market as a 
whole, Order 745 specifically addressed 
payments to DRRs. FERC found that the 
rates paid to DRRs by some electric system 
operators were too low to adequately 
incentivize the development of demand 
response. The Order mandated that, in certain 
circumstances, a system operator must pay to 
DRRs the same price for a forgone megawatt 
of consumption that the system operator 
would have paid a generator that had 
successfully bid that megawatt into the 
wholesale market. After notice and comment, 
Order 745 was passed by four of FERC’s five 
board members over the dissent of 
Commissioner Moeller. The Commission 
received numerous requests for rehearing, 
which it denied. Electric Power Supply 
Association, a trade group of power 
suppliers, petitioned the D.C. Circuit for 
review. 
 153 
The D.C. Circuit vacated Order No. 745. 
Writing for the court, Judge Brown found 
that FERC had exceeded the bounds of its 
jurisdiction in issuing Order 745, and that 
Order 745 was “arbitrary and capricious.” To 
analyze FERC’s claim that it had jurisdiction 
over wholesale demand response, Judge 
Brown outlined the relevant statutory 
provisions. The Act contains two sources of 
agency power, and two prohibitions, relevant 
to the court’s decision. Section 201(b)(1) 
grants FERC jurisdiction over “the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce,” but not over “any other sale,” 
which is the domain of the states. Sections 
205 and 206 contain a broad ancillary grant 
of power over “‘all rules and regulations 
affecting . . . rates’ in connection with the 
wholesale sale of electric energy.” Finally, 
section 201(a) states that “FERC’s reach 
‘extend[s] only to those matters which are not 
subject to regulation by the States.’” To 
determine whether FERC had jurisdiction to 
regulate the wholesale price of demand 
response, the court recognized that it must 
apply the Chevron test, determining first 
“whether the statutory text forecloses the 
agency’s assertion of authority,” and, if 
instead the statute was “silent or ambiguous,” 
deferring to “the agency’s reasonable 
construction.” 
 
The court began by analyzing the 
jurisdictional grants. FERC did not have 
jurisdiction under the “sale . . . at wholesale” 
language of section 201(b)(1) because 
demand response is a non-sale. Next, the 
court considered FERC’s argument that it 
had jurisdiction under the sections 205 and 
206 authorization to regulate practices 
“directly affect[ing] wholesale rates.” The 
court accepted that wholesale demand 
response directly affects wholesale prices, 
but found that the Commission’s 
characterization of its “affecting” jurisdiction 
“ha[d] no limiting principle,” “could 
ostensibly authorize FERC to regulate . . . the 
steel, fuel, and labor markets,” and would 
allow the agency to “‘lure’ non-jurisdictional 
resources into the wholesale market . . . to 
create jurisdiction” by requiring generous 
compensation. 
 
To provide a limiting principle for sections 
205 and 206, the court turned to the “overall 
statutory scheme.” Noting that under section 
201(a), FERC’s “reach ‘extend[s] only to 
those matters which are not subject to 
regulation by the States,’” the court reasoned 
that “[t]he broad ‘affecting’ language of §§ 
205 and 206 does not erase the specific limits 
of § 201. Such limits could not come from 
section 201(b)(1)’s exclusion from regulation 
of “any other sale”: demand response is not a 
sale. Instead, the “statutory scheme as a 
whole” showed that demand response, “while 
not necessarily a retail sale, is indeed part of 
the retail market, which . . . is exclusively 
within the state’s jurisdiction.” Finding that 
the Act unambiguously foreclosed FERC 
jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit invalidated 
Order 745. 
 
The court also held that the agency had acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing Order 
745. FERC had failed, in light of 
Commissioner Moeller’s “persuasive” 
argument that “overcompensation cannot be 
just and reasonable,” to “adequately explain[] 
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how [Order 745] results in just 
compensation.” 
 
Judge Edwards dissented. He agreed that 
Order 745 appeared to fall under FERC’s 
“affecting” jurisdiction, but thought that the 
limit the D.C. Circuit had previously read 
into sections 205 and 206 — that FERC could 
regulate only conduct with “direct” effects on 
wholesale prices — was sufficient. Because 
wholesale demand response directly affects 
wholesale prices, Order 745 was a valid 
exercise of FERC’s “affecting” jurisdiction 
unless barred by section 201(b)(1)’s 
preclusion of FERC regulation of “any other 
sale of electric energy.” As demand response 
could be reasonably construed not to be a 
sale, section 201(b)(1) did not 
unambiguously preclude regulation. 
Moreover, section 201(a) could not control 
because the Supreme Court had previously 
interpreted it to be a “mere policy 
declaration.” As the Act did not speak 
unambiguously to the precise question of 
whether demand response was a retail sale, 
Chevron deference to FERC’s interpretation 
of the jurisdictional grant was required. 
 
Although the majority established new limits 
on sections 205 and 206, the preexisting 
limits of the Act and case law adequately 
cabined FERC’s jurisdiction. The existence 
of these limits, the paucity of statutory 
grounding for a limiting principle, and the 
availability of an alternative holding all 
should have counseled the court either to 
have avoided announcing a limiting principle 
at all or to have delineated the limits of 
sections 205 and 206 more narrowly. Even 
assuming that FERC had overstepped in this 
instance, the potential breadth of the court’s 
holding has caused uncertainty in the 
industry and has unduly foreclosed the 
possibilities of beneficial regulation. 
 
The statutory grounding for the court’s 
limiting principle was shaky; by looking to 
the “statutory scheme,” the court derived a 
limiting principle from two provisions, 
neither of which would have provided that 
restriction alone. Although section 201(a) 
appears an appealing candidate to supply 
limits to FERC’s jurisdiction, Supreme Court 
precedent forecloses this possibility. Section 
201(a) “declare[s] that . . . Federal regulation 
. . . [is] to extend only to those matters which 
are not subject to regulation by the States.” 
However, it begins a section entitled 
“[d]eclaration of policy; application of 
subchapter,” and the Supreme Court has 
determined section 201(a) to be a “mere 
‘policy declaration.’” Had the court sought a 
jurisdictional limit in section 201(a) alone, 
the decision to deny Chevron deference to 
FERC would have been difficult to support: 
while (as the court recognized) a specific 
limit should trump a general grant of 
jurisdiction, it is not clear that section 201(a), 
a statement “of great generality,” would 
unambiguously trump the general language 
of sections 205 and 206, even in light of a 
separate “retail sale” limit in section 
201(b)(1). The court’s reading of section 
201(a) as part of a statutory scheme setting 
internal, implicit limits on sections 205 and 
206 ignored the section’s status as a general 
policy declaration. 
 
Likewise, the court could not have relied 
solely upon section 201(b)(1)’s denial of 
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FERC jurisdiction over “any other sale[s]” 
than those “at wholesale.” The problem in 
using section 201(b)(1) to limit the grant of 
“affecting jurisdiction” in sections 205 and 
206 is that the plain meaning will not easily 
support it — section 201(b)(1) speaks of 
retail and wholesale “sales,” not markets. A 
reliance on section 201(b)(1) to supply limits 
would also have been in tension with the 
court’s own earlier reading of an identical 
term. The term “sale” is used both to grant 
and to limit FERC jurisdiction within the 
same sentence of section 201(b)(1): “[The 
Commission’s jurisdiction] shall apply to . . . 
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce, but . . . shall not apply 
to any other sale of electric energy . . . .” In 
dismissing FERC’s claim of section 
201(b)(1) authority, the court relied on the 
plain meaning of “sale”: “[D]emand response 
is not a wholesale sale of electricity; in fact, 
it is not a sale at all.” If section 201(b)(1) 
were construed to limit FERC’s jurisdiction 
over the retail market, it should logically also 
be construed to grant authority over the 
wholesale market. Because demand response 
falls somewhere between the two, section 
201(b)(1) would not unambiguously preclude 
FERC regulation of wholesale demand 
response. 
 
The court’s search for limits led to a principle 
derived from the statutory scheme that 
nonetheless is in tension with the rest of the 
statute. As the court acknowledged, the plain 
text of sections 205 and 206 supports 
jurisdiction. Further, it is difficult to find in 
the statutory scheme a clear intent against 
demand response, which did not exist at the 
time of the Act’s passage. In New York v. 
FERC, the Supreme Court made the same 
point about another emergent phenomenon, 
“unbundled transmissions.” The Court 
reasoned that because unbundled 
transmissions “ha[d] been a recent 
development” and “ha[d] never been ‘subject 
to regulation by the States,’” section 201(a) 
did not preclude FERC jurisdiction. The 
same argument applies to demand response 
— an emergent phenomenon not previously 
subject to state regulation. 
 
The court had several options besides broadly 
holding that FERC lacks jurisdiction over 
demand response, even if it did not want to 
follow Judge Edwards in deferring to the 
agency. The fact that the court arrived at the 
alternative holding that Order 745 was 
arbitrary and capricious meant that the court 
did not need to reach the jurisdictional 
question at all. An alternative would have 
been to rule the present regulation ultra vires 
on very narrow grounds. In particular, the 
court recognized that FERC’s “lur[ing]” of 
customers from the retail to the wholesale 
market through preferential rates was “the 
heart of the Petitioners’ challenge. The court 
could have found that this way of attracting 
customers made the regulation an 
impermissible intrusion on the retail markets. 
Such a finding would have enabled the court 
to address the conduct that most troubled the 
petitioners, while still leaving room for 
wholesale demand response that did not 
distort retail customers’ incentives. 
 
The capaciousness of the court’s decision to 
locate demand response unambiguously 
within the retail “market” has the potential to 
lead to jurisdictional confusion. As the case 
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itself demonstrates, regulation that occurs at 
the first instance in the wholesale market can 
now be ruled ultra vires if it has an 
impermissibly direct effect on the retail 
market (unless it directly regulates a 
wholesale sale of electric energy). This result 
is problematic, given the court’s recognition 
that “a change in one market will inevitably 
beget a change in the other.” The 
development of both new technologies and 
FERC’s regulatory program means that 
questions that do not neatly fall in one or the 
other of section 201(b)(1)’s categories are 
likely to arise more often. Already, FERC’s 
entire system of wholesale demand response, 
widely agreed to be beneficial, is being 
challenged in a FERC hearing. 
 
In EPSA, the court turned to the statutory 
scheme to infer a limiting principle that the 
provisions of the Federal Power Act taken 
individually did not provide. Given the 
statute’s limitations for supplying such a 
principle, the court should have moved more 
carefully to limit the upheaval caused by its 
holding and to allow FERC greater room to 
maneuver in the face of technological change 
in the energy sector. 
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Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo 
14-1146 
Ruling Below: Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. Iowa 2014) 
Peg Bouaphakeo and other named plaintiffs are employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. They represent a 
class of employees at Tyson's meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. They sued Tyson 
for not paying wages due under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 
et seq., and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL), Iowa Code 91A.1 et seq. A jury 
returned a verdict for the class. Tyson appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this 
court affirms. 
Question Presented: (1) Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored 
and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action 
certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined 
with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in 
a sample. (2) Whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a 
collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class 
contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.  
 
Peg BOUAPHAKEO; Javier Frayre; Jose A. Garcia; Mario Martinez; Jesus A. Montes; 
Heribento Renteria, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals,  
Plaintiffs–Appellees  
v.  
TYSON FOODS, INC.,  
Defendant–Appellant 
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit 
Decided on August 25, 2014 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, 
Circuit Judges. 
I 
The employees are current and former “gang-
time” employees at Tyson's facility. The 
background is similar to that in Lopez v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., (adapted to the facts of 
this case): 
To calculate the employees' compensable 
working time, Tyson measures “gang 
time”—when the employees are at their 
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working stations and the production line is 
moving. The employees claim Tyson failed 
to provide FLSA overtime compensation for 
donning (putting on) personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and clothing before 
production and again after lunch, and for 
doffing (taking off) PPE and clothing before 
lunch and again after production. The PPE 
and clothing worn by individual employees 
vary depending on their role in the process. 
Tyson classifies items of PPE and clothing as 
either “unique” or “non-unique” to the meat-
processing industry. The employees also seek 
compensation for transporting the items from 
lockers to the production floor. 
In addition to “gang time,” Tyson adds “K-
code” time to each employee's paycheck. 
Before 2007, Tyson paid four minutes of K-
code time per day to each [employee in a 
department where knives were used] in order 
to compensate for the donning and doffing of 
unique items. From [February] 2007 to [June] 
2010, Tyson added [several minutes] per day 
for pre-and post-shift walking time required 
of the employee․ Tyson does not record the 
actual time that employees perform any of 
these tasks. 
The FLSA prohibits the employment of any 
person “for a workweek longer than forty 
hours unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess 
of the hours above specified at a rate not less 
than one and one-half times the regular rate 
at which he is employed.” An employee who 
sues for unpaid overtime “has the burden of 
proving that he performed work for which he 
was not properly compensated.” At one time, 
the Supreme Court defined work as “physical 
or mental exertion (whether burdensome or 
not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit of the employer and his business.” 
The Court then “clarified that ‘exertion’ was 
not in fact necessary for an activity to 
constitute ‘work’ under the FLSA.”  
Whether an employee's activity is “work” 
does not end the compensability analysis. In 
the Portal–to–Portal Act, Congress excluded 
some activities that might otherwise 
constitute work from the FLSA. The Act 
accepts two categories: 
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to 
and from the actual place of 
performance of the principal activity 
or activities which such employee is 
employed to perform, and 
(2) activities which are preliminary to 
or postliminary to said principal 
activity or activities, which occur 
either prior to the time on any 
particular workday at which such 
employee commences, or subsequent 
to the time on any particular workday 
at which he ceases, such principal 
activity or activities. 
The Department of Labor has a “continuous 
workday rule,” generally defining an 
employee's “workday” as “the period 
between the commencement and completion 
on the same workday of an employee's 
principal activity or activities.” During the 
continuous workday, the compensability of 
all activities that otherwise satisfy the 
requirements of the FLSA is not affected by 
the Portal–to–Portal Act's exceptions. In 
Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that “during 
a continuous workday, any walking time that 
occurs after the beginning of the employee's 
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first principal activity and before the end of 
the employee's last principal activity is 
excluded from the scope of [the Portal–to–
Portal Act], and as a result is covered by the 
FLSA.”  
The employees sued in 2007, claiming that 
Tyson's K-code time was insufficient to 
cover compensable pre- and post-production 
line activities, violating the FLSA and 
IWPCL. The district court certified the FLSA 
claim as a collective action and the IWPCL 
claim as a Rule 23 class action. During a 
nine-day trial, plaintiffs proved liability and 
damages by using individual timesheets, 
along with average donning, doffing, and 
walking times calculated from 744 employee 
observations. The jury returned a verdict for 
the class of $2,892,378.70. With liquidated 
damages, the final judgment totaled 
$5,785,757.40. 
II 
Tyson argues that the district court erred in 
certifying the FLSA collective action—under 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)—and the IWPCL class—
under Rule 23. Class certification is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. A district court may 
certify a class under Rule 23(b) if “questions 
of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members,” and “a class 
action is superior to other available methods 
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” The FLSA allows named 
plaintiffs to sue “for and in behalf of 
themselves and other employees similarly 
situated.” Plaintiffs may be similarly situated 
when “they suffer from a single, FLSA-
violating policy, and when proof of that 
policy or of conduct in conformity with that 
policy proves a violation as to all the 
plaintiffs.” A court may consider “(1) 
disparate factual and employment settings of 
the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various 
defenses available to defendant which appear 
to be individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3) 
fairness and procedural considerations.”  
According to Tyson, factual differences 
between plaintiffs-differences in PPE and 
clothing between positions, the individual 
routines of employees, and variation in duties 
and management among departments-make 
class certification improper. These 
differences, Tyson says, do not allow the 
class action to “generate common answers 
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Unlike 
Dukes, Tyson had a specific company 
policy—the payment of K-code time for 
donning, doffing, and walking—that applied 
to all class members. Unlike Dukes, class 
members worked at the same plant and used 
similar equipment. The time study showed 
that donning and doffing all equipment, plus 
walking, took an average of 18 minutes in the 
fabrication department and 21 minutes in the 
kill department. True, applying Tyson's K-
code policy and expert testimony to 
“generate ․ answers” for individual overtime 
claims did require inference, but this 
inference is allowable under Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co. While individual 
plaintiffs varied in their donning and doffing 
routines, their complaint is not “dominated 
by individual issues” such that “the varied 
circumstances ․ prevent ‘one stroke’ 
determination.” The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in certifying the class. 
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Tyson also contends that the class should be 
decertified because evidence at trial showed 
that some class members did not work 
overtime and would receive no FLSA 
damages even if Tyson under-compensated 
their donning, doffing, and walking. Tyson 
exaggerates the authority for its contention.  
At any rate, at Tyson's request, the jury was 
instructed, “Any employee who has already 
received full compensation for all activities 
you may find to be compensable is not 
entitled to recover any damages.” Tyson's 
instruction directed the jury to treat plaintiffs 
with no damages as class members. It is 
“fundamental that where the defendant ․ 
‘invited error’ there can be no reversible 
error.”  
III. 
Tyson believes that plaintiffs improperly 
relied on a formula to prove liability. In 
Dukes, the Supreme Court disapproved of 
“Trial by Formula.” 
A sample set of the class members would be 
selected, as to whom liability for sex 
discrimination and the back-pay owing as a 
result would be determined in depositions 
supervised by a master. The percentage of 
claims determined to be valid would then be 
applied to the entire remaining class, and the 
number of (presumptively) valid claims thus 
derived would be multiplied by the average 
backpay award in the sample set to arrive at 
the entire class recovery-without further 
individualized proceedings. 
Here, plaintiffs do not prove liability only for 
a sample set of class members. They prove 
liability for the class as a whole, using 
employee time records to establish individual 
damages. Using statistics or samples in 
litigation is not necessarily trial by formula.  
Plaintiffs do rely on inference from average 
donning, doffing, and walking times, but they 
apply this analysis to each class member 
individually. Using this representative 
evidence is comparable to a jury applying 
testimony from named plaintiffs to find 
classwide liability. For the donning, doffing, 
and walking in Mt. Clemens, testimony from 
eight employees established liability for 300 
similarly situated workers. To prove 
damages, the Court remanded for “the 
determination of the amount of walking time 
involved and the amount of preliminary 
activities performed” based on “whatever 
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the 
employees' evidence.”  
Tyson claims that plaintiffs presented 
insufficient evidence to prove damages 
classwide. This court “will not reverse a jury 
verdict for insufficient evidence unless ‘after 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, [it concludes] that no 
reasonable juror could have returned a 
verdict for the non-moving party.’” Tyson 
has no evidence of the specific time each 
class member spent donning, doffing, and 
walking. “[W]hen an employer has failed to 
keep proper records, courts should not 
hesitate to award damages based on the ‘just 
and reasonable inference’ from the evidence 
presented.”  
To prove damages, plaintiffs use individual 
timesheets, along with average times 
calculated from a sample of 744 observations 
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of employee donning, doffing, and walking. 
Plaintiffs' expert testified that the sample was 
large for this type of study, representative, 
and approximately random. He testified that 
the study used “accepted procedure in 
industrial engineering.” Tyson's Director of 
Human Resources testified that K-code time 
did not include the donning and doffing of 
much non-unique PPE. Pay data—which 
came directly from Tyson—showed the 
amount of K-code time each individual 
received. Sufficient evidence existed to 
support a “reasonable inference” of class-
wide liability.  
Tyson asserts that even if sufficient evidence 
supported damages, plaintiffs' claims still fail 
because it is uncertain if any uncompensated 
work was performed, citing Carmody v. 
Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners 
only applies where the existence of damages 
is certain․ Anderson allows uncertainty only 
for the amount of damages.”). In Carmody, 
the plaintiffs did not “produce[ ] evidence 
indicating any hours worked over forty hours 
per week ․ were never paid.” The plaintiffs 
“did not provide any evidence of actual 
damages because the testimony contained no 
reference to overtime hours that violated the 
FLSA.” Here, Tyson stipulates that “workers 
at the Storm Lake plant tend to work a 
significant amount of overtime on a weekly 
basis.” Plaintiffs show uncompensated 
overtime work by applying average donning, 
doffing, and walking times to employee 
timesheets. The evidence is “susceptible to 
[the] reasonable inference” that the jury's 
verdict is correct.  
The judgment is affirmed. 
BENTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
For two independent but somewhat factually 
related reasons, this case should be reversed, 
remanded and dismissed. First, under the 
circumstances of this litigation, neither the 
putative Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
collective action (the so-called federal class) 
nor the purported Iowa Wage Payment 
Collection Law (IWPCL) Rule 23(b)(3) class 
(the so-called state class) were eligible for 
class certification, either as a matter of fact or 
a matter of law. Second, Rule 23 state-law-
based class actions are fundamentally 
different than collective actions authorized 
under the FLSA and may not be procedurally 
homogenized for trial as done in this case. 
 I. BACKGROUND 
This litigation generally involves hourly 
production employees of Tyson Foods at its 
Storm Lake, Iowa, meat-processing facility. 
But, the dispute more basically involves six 
named (lead) plaintiff employees from the 
kill, cut and retrim departments of the Storm 
Lake operation who were paid their wages 
using, in part, Tyson's “gang-time” 
compensation system but who also claim to 
have been owed overtime pay resulting from 
disparate compensable work activities 
occurring at times other than while earning 
daily “gang time” kill, cut and retrim 
department production line compensation. 
The six attempt to assert two separate 
collective actions-a federal statutory action 
asserting violations of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–219, and a state statutory action 
separately based upon the IWPCL, Iowa 
Code Chapter 91A. 
 162 
This case was originally assigned to the 
Honorable Mark Bennett who conditionally 
“certified” a federal collective action class 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and a 
purported IWPCL state law class pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 
Then, because the Honorable John Jarvey 
was already assigned to several comparable 
cases involving Tyson, this matter was 
transferred to Judge Jarvey for further pretrial 
and post-trial proceedings and for trial. The 
case has now been litigated and is before this 
panel on appeal. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Federal FLSA Class 
A collective action to recover damages 
permitted by the FLSA “may be maintained 
against any employer ․ in any Federal or 
State court of competent jurisdiction by 
anyone or more employees for and in behalf 
of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.” However, 
“[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to 
any such action unless he gives his consent in 
writing to become such a party and such 
consent is filed in the court in which such 
action is brought.” 
The six named lead plaintiff employees who 
sought to establish this collective action bore 
the “burden of showing that the opt-in 
[consenting] plaintiffs are similarly situated 
to the lead plaintiffs.” Judge Bennett, 
apparently recognizing the likely existence of 
numerous factors unrelated to the “gang-
time” pay used to determine a given Tyson 
employee's regular wages-factors amply 
established by the evidence at trial-certified a 
“conditional” FLSA class consisting of 
employees from the kill, cut and retrim 
departments at the Tyson plant paid through 
the so-called gang-time compensation system 
within a discrete time period set forth in the 
certification. Indeed, the conditional 
certification related only to the three 
departments and the gang-time pay earned in 
the production line in those departments. No 
other regular or overtime pay calculation 
factors discussed at the merits portion of the 
trial (such as: individual employment codes, 
specific duties, wage-rate variations, knife 
wielding protections, sanitary clothing and 
equipment, part-time work, illness, injury, 
shift differentials, and routine production line 
overtime) were in any way incorporated as 
limitations on the use of the FLSA 
conditional class. The record reveals that this 
“conditional” designation was never 
withdrawn or modified at any time during or 
after the trial. According to the joint 
stipulation of facts by the parties, there were 
444 employees who consented to be a part of 
this FLSA collective action class including 
the six named lead plaintiffs. 
B. The IWPCL State Class 
“‘In order to obtain class certification, a 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the 
class should be certified and that the 
requirements of Rule 23 are met.’” Judge 
Bennett, at the request of the same six named 
plaintiffs who sought creation of and joined 
the FLSA collective class, ultimately 
certified what he termed a “modified” 3,344–
person putative Rule 23 state law class 
consisting of all “current and former 
employees of Tyson's Storm Lake, Iowa, 
processing facility who have been employed 
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at any time from February 7, 2005, to the 
present, and who are or were paid under a 
‘gang-time’ compensation system in the Kill, 
Cut or Retrim departments.” This 
certification also included no other limiting 
or enhancing overtime pay calculation 
elements. The record discloses that this 
certification was likewise never further 
embellished or modified during or after trial. 
The “gang-time system of payment” as 
referred to by Judge Bennett and defined by 
the evidence is a system where employees are 
paid from the time their production line starts 
to the time their production line ends. There 
is no contention by the named plaintiffs that 
the Storm Lake Tyson employees did not 
receive all wages due and owing for time 
worked during the production line gang-time 
pay periods. So, standing by itself, as it does 
in the class certifications, the gang-time 
production line classification means little in 
the context of proving at trial through 
evidence common to the class the overtime 
pay claims of the 3,344 members of the 
allegedly underpaid overtime class. Supreme 
Court and Eighth Circuit precedent demands 
otherwise.  
To be certified for purposes of Rule 23(a), the 
collective groupings, that is the putative 
classes, must have been such that Tyson was 
positioned to assert its legitimately held 
common-to-the-class defenses against all 
members of the group who claimed to have 
earned unpaid overtime wages. In this same 
context, the class must have been limited to 
Tyson employees who could and did 
establish entitlement to overtime pay 
resulting from overtime work performed 
during compensable time, that is, work 
performed at times other than production line 
gang-time pay periods-periods for which all 
class members were already routinely, 
regularly, and unquestionably paid by Tyson 
in accordance with the law. 
“In order to obtain class certification, a 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the 
class should be certified and that the 
requirements of Rule 23 are met.” While a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class was purportedly certified, 
any Rule 23 class may only be lawfully 
certified if the “trial court is satisfied, after a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of 
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Actual, not 
presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) 
remains indispensable. Frequently, as in this 
case, “ ‘rigorous analysis' will entail some 
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's 
underlying claim.” Rule 23(a)'s four bedrock 
requirements are numerosity, commonality, 
typicality and adequate representation (here, 
a named plaintiff with standing). 
Commonality requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate at the time of the merits hearing 
on the underlying claim-that all class 
members suffered the same injury. So, if the 
locution “injury” includes the measure of a 
class member's individual damages, as I 
believe it does, this class fails on that score 
alone. 
The court majority apparently sees a pathway 
around plaintiffs' legal dilemma arising from 
the above-noted class formulation failures. 
Although acknowledging that class 
certification is improper when a “windfall” is 
conferred on some class members, ante at 7, 
the court makes the following observation: 
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At any rate, at Tyson's request, the jury was 
instructed, “Any employee who has already 
received full compensation for all activities 
you may find to be compensable is not 
entitled to recover any damages.” Tyson's 
instruction directed the jury to treat plaintiffs 
with no damages as class members. It is 
“fundamental that where the defendant ․ 
‘invited error’ there can be no reversible 
error.”  
Thus, says the court, Tyson “directed the jury 
to treat plaintiffs with no damages as class 
members.” However, Tyson made no such 
class membership directive to the jury 
through its instructional request and Beason 
and Steele are wholly inapposite as case 
precedent for the court's faulty premise. The 
cases deal only with run-of-the-mill 
evidentiary matters, not waivers of legal 
principles. Beason simply opened the door to 
the making of a Bruton exception by 
permitting an admission from a non-
testifying co-defendant, and Steele admitted 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to 
clarify and rebut an issue opened by the 
criminal defendant's cross-examination. 
Tyson, after vigorously resisting class action 
formulations at every turn in this litigation, 
and being denied, properly requested an 
instruction that the plaintiffs be held to their 
evidentiary burdens of proof. 
C. The Merits 
Fundamentally, as previously noted, this case 
emerges from two separate causes of action 
brought through a single federal court 
complaint—a federal law cause of action 
alleging liability leading to damages arising 
from violation of the FLSA and a state law 
cause of action alleging liability and damages 
arising from violation of the IWPCL. The 
burden of proof on all issues of statutory 
liability, injury and measure of damages rests 
squarely upon the shoulders of the named 
plaintiffs. In this case, gang-time pay is not in 
dispute. The plaintiffs contend, as does the 
court majority, that the overtime pay dispute 
involves time spent by a class of Tyson 
employees in doffing and donning various 
sanitary and personal protection equipment 
before and after the gang-time production 
line work has been completed each day. 
Tyson's Storm Lake employees are required 
to wear a different combination of sanitary 
and protective gear. Those employees 
wearing knives to use in conjunction with 
their particular duties on a particular day are 
required to wear a combination of a plastic 
belly guard, mesh apron, mesh sleeve, 
plexiglass arm guard, mesh glove, Polar 
glove, membrane skinner gloves, Polar 
sleeves, “steel” for maintaining the knives 
and knife scabbards (“knife related gear”). 
Other workers are required to wear a hard hat, 
hairnet, beard net, earplugs, ear muffs, rubber 
or cotton gloves, and rubber or plastic aprons 
(“sanitary gear”). 
From 1998 until February 4, 2007, Tyson 
paid four extra minutes beyond production 
line time for all production employees, 
referred to as “K–Code” time. From February 
4, 2007, to June 28, 2010, Tyson ceased 
paying non-knife-wielding employees for the 
time donning and doffing sanitary gear. From 
February 4, 2007, to June 28, 2010, Tyson 
paid knife-wielding employees between 4 to 
8 minutes of KCode time, depending on the 
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job, and employees who did not have a knife 
did not receive K–Code time payments. 
Plaintiffs offered evidence at trial concerning 
a sample of putative class employees from 
Dr. Kenneth Mericle and Dr. Liesl Fox. Fox's 
calculation testimony fed off of Mericle's 
evidence concerning Rule 23 class damages 
for overtime pay. Fox testified, assuming 
Mericle's evidence was true, that at least 212 
members of the purported class did not suffer 
any damages because the doffing and 
donning time, less the K–Code time “would 
not have been enough to kick them into 
overtime.” Further, while the plaintiffs' 
evidence generally indicated some individual 
overtime damages ranging from a few cents 
to several thousand dollars, there were at least 
509 workers whose injuries ranged from 
$0.27 to less than $100. And, the record 
discloses that the jury in returning only a 
single gross amount of damages verdict, as 
instructed, discounted plaintiffs' evidence by 
more than half, likely indicating that more 
than half of the putative class suffered either 
no damages or only a de minimis injury 
measured in cents rather than dollars. In spite 
of having the burden of proof, there was no 
evidence adduced by plaintiffs that 
established the number of purported class 
member employees fully compensated or not 
fully compensated by the K–Code payments 
already paid by Tyson. It is evident, however, 
that many class employees fit within each 
category and all were apparently included as 
beneficiaries of the single damages verdict 
returned by the jury. 
Rule 23(a)(2) contemplates that “there are 
questions of law or fact common to the 
class.” “Commonality requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the class members have 
suffered the same injury. This does not mean 
merely that they have all suffered a violation 
of the same provision of law.” Rather, 
“[t]heir claims must depend upon a common 
contention. That common contention, 
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is 
capable of class-wide resolution-which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity 
will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one 
stroke.”  “What matters to class certification 
is not the raising of common ‘questions' ․ 
but, rather the capacity of a class-wide 
proceeding to generate common answers apt 
to drive the resolution of the litigation.” That 
was not the case here. While it is true that all 
class members were subject to a common 
policy-gang-time payment-there is no 
“common answer,” arising from the evidence 
concerning the individual overtime pay 
questions at issue in this case. Thus, this case 
with these classes cannot be resolved in “one 
stroke,” given the differences in donning and 
doffing times, K–Code payments, 
abbreviated gang time shifts, absenteeism, 
sickness, vacation and a myriad of other 
relevant factors. The “rigorous” analysis of 
class certification in this case, which overlaps 
with the merits as required by Dukes, clearly 
discloses that the Rule 23 class claim does not 
comply with either rule or precedent and 
should have been decertified. 
Finally, the wisdom of the Supreme Court's 
statement in Symczyk, that Rule 23 class 
actions and collective actions under the 
FLSA are fundamentally different and thus 
do not lend themselves to inextricably 
intertwined trials, as here, is well dramatized 
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by this case. Here we have undifferentiated 
presentations of evidence, including 
significant numbers of the putative classes 
suffering no injury and members of the entire 
classes suffering wide variations in damages, 
ultimately resulting in a single-sum class-
wide verdict from which each purported class 
member, damaged or not, will receive a pro-
rata portion of the jury's one-figure verdict. 
Assuming that the district court could now re-
open the proceedings in an effort to deal with 
an individual plaintiff's damages using the 
Mericle/Fox evidence, the exercise would be 
laborious, virtually unguided, and well 
outside of the limiting parameters the 
Supreme Court has, as a matter of law, placed 
upon use of the Rule 23 class action 
machinery. 
III. CONCLUSION 
From this result, I dissent. 
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“High Court Told to Kill Tyson Workers’ $5.8M Don-Doff Award” 
Law360 
Kurt Orzeck 
March 27, 2015 
 
Tyson Foods Inc. wants the U.S. Supreme 
Court to overturn a $5.8 million judgment 
awarded to a class of employees in a 
compensation dispute over time spent putting 
on and taking off protective gear, according 
to a court filing made public Friday. 
 
In a petition for writ of certiorari, Tyson 
argued a district court shouldn’t have 
certified the class due to differences in the 
amount of time that employees spent on 
donning and doffing protective gear. The 
workers alleged that Tyson's so-called gang-
time compensation system short-changed 
them on pay. 
 
In August, a divided Eighth Circuit panel 
upheld a decision by U.S. District Judge John 
A. Jarvey that affirmed a jury verdict 
favoring the workers, saying he properly 
certified their claims under both the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and Iowa state law. In 
November, a divided Eighth Circuit declined 
Tyson’s rehearing bid. 
 
Tyson argued in its Supreme Court petition, 
filed Mar. 19, that other circuit courts have 
held that a class can’t be certified if plaintiffs 
try to get an aggregate damages award by 
extrapolating from an allegedly fictional 
“average” class member. 
 
“This court’s review is also needed to resolve 
the confusion among the lower courts on the 
question of whether a class may be certified 
when it includes uninjured class members,” 
Tyson said, adding that hundreds of 
employees in the suit allegedly didn’t work 
any overtime at all due to donning and 
doffing. “This court should grant review to 
resolve the confusion and put an end to this 
unlawful practice.” 
 
The petition is the latest move in a suit that 
traces back to 2007, when workers at Tyson's 
meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, 
Iowa, claimed Tyson's policy didn't fully 
compensate them for pre- and post-
production line activities, according to court 
documents. 
 
In September 2011, an Iowa jury found that 
the plaintiffs had proven that the time they 
spent donning and doffing hard hats, work 
boots, hairnets, aprons, gloves and earplugs 
constituted an indispensable part of their 
work at Tyson plants. The verdict awarded 
the workers $2.9 million, and a subsequent 
ruling on liquidated damages upped the total 
final judgment to $5.8 million, according to 
court documents. 
 
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark 
2011 ruling in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 
Tyson argued on appeal that alleged 
differences in the donning and doffing times 
didn’t allow the class action to "generate 
common answers apt to drive the resolution 
of the litigation," according to court 
documents. 
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But the Eighth Circuit disagreed in August, 
saying that unlike Dukes, Tyson had a 
specific company policy that applied to all 
class members. Also in contrast to Dukes, the 
class members in the instant case worked at 
the same plant and used similar equipment, 
the panel said. 
 
Though a majority of Eighth Circuit judges 
denied Tyson's rehearing request in 
November, six judges on the circuit said they 
would have granted a rehearing en banc or a 
panel rehearing. 
 
Tyson argued in its Supreme Court petition 
that three production workers who testified at 
trial said they spent different amounts of time 
on donning- and doffing-related activities. A 
study showed a wide variation among the 
times, with employees spending between 
about a half-minute and 13 minutes donning 
equipment in the locker room pre-shift and 
between roughly two and nine minutes 
doffing and storing equipment post-shift, 
according to Tyson. 
 
A Tyson spokesman told Law360 on Friday 
that the company was initially involved in 
this case because federal wage and hour laws 
are not precise in determining how to 
compensate certain activities. 
 
"We’re now addressing another aspect of the 
case: whether there’s enough evidence for it 
to be considered a class action," he said. 
"Since even the federal courts of appeal are 
divided over what employees qualify to be 
part of such class action cases, we’ve asked 
the U.S. Supreme Court to get involved. 
We’re hopeful our request will be granted."
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 “Roberts Court to Review Wage Theft Class Action Case” 
RH Reality Check 
Jessica Mason Pieklo 
June 8, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
consider new limits on workers’ ability to 
collectively challenge pay and workplace 
issues under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA). 
The Roberts Court granted review in the case 
of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, a class action 
lawsuit against Tyson Foods Inc. over the pay 
of more than 3,000 employees at its Storm 
Lake, Iowa, pork processing plant. Peg 
Bouaphakeo, along with other Tyson 
employees challenged a series of practices, 
including Tyson’s refusal to provide 
overtime compensation for the time 
employees spent “donning (putting on) 
personal protective equipment (PPE)” and 
clothing before and again after lunch, and for 
doffing (removing) PPE and clothing before 
and after lunch. 
The employees sued Tyson for failing to pay 
wages under the FLSA and Iowa Wage 
Payment Collection Law. A jury returned a 
verdict for the certified class of workers, 
ordering Tyson to pay $5.8 million in past 
wages and damages. 
A federal appeals court affirmed the 
multimillion-dollar verdict against Tyson. 
The Roberts Court on Monday agreed to step 
in and hear Tyson’s arguments that it should 
only have to defend against claims by 
workers who were injured by Tyson’s wage-
and-hour violations, and not the entire 
certified class of workers in the lawsuit. 
In other words, Tyson is not defending its 
actual labor practices but instead arguing the 
courts made a procedural error by allowing 
Bouaphakeo’s lawsuit to have been certified 
as a class action. 
To support their petition for review to the 
Roberts Court, Tyson and other industry 
groups rely on the Roberts Court decision in 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, a 2011 decision that 
revoked class action certification from what 
would have been one of the largest gender 
bias lawsuits of its kind. That decision 
significantly curtailed the scope of potential 
class action lawsuits under federal 
employment laws. 
Industry groups hope to have similar success 
curtailing workers’ rights to bring class 
action lawsuits under the FSLA in 
Bouaphekeo.  
A decision in favor of Tyson could have a 
wide-reaching effect. Like pay 
discrimination cases, wage-and-hour 
lawsuits often involve individual damages 
claims that may not amount to a lot of money 
compared to the time and expense involved 
in prosecuting those claims. Class action 
lawsuits in which workers can aggregate their 
claims and money damages, however, give 
workers leverage in fighting against wage 
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theft as the aggregated damages can add up 
to multimillion-dollar verdicts, as it did 
against Tyson in Bouaphakeo. 
Monday’s decision to review the class-
certification in Bouaphakeo may not be the 
only FLSA class action case the Roberts 
Court will hear next term. 
The Court considered Bouaphakeo along 
with two other petitions, both filed by 
Walmart, challenging FLSA class action 
verdicts in Pennsylvania totaling more than 
$187 million. Despite considering the cases 
together, the Roberts Court on Monday took 
no action on the Walmart cases challenging 
class action certifications under the FLSA, 
which means the Court could be waiting to 
see how the arguments in Bouaphakeo unfold 
before deciding how broadly to review class 
action certification in wage theft claims. 
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“Game Changer?” 
Seyfarth Shaw LLP 
Richard Alfred, Patrick Bannon, and Esther Slater McDonald 
June 9, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to 
hear an appeal challenging a nearly $6.0 
million judgment in a collective and class 
action case against Tyson Foods, Inc. In 
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, a wage and 
hour collective and class action regarding the 
compensability of time spent donning and 
doffing, the Court will decide (1) whether 
liability and damages may be determined by 
statistical techniques that presume all class or 
collective members are similar; and (2) 
whether a class or collective action may 
include individuals who were not injured. 
 
Case Background 
 
Plaintiff employees brought a collective and 
class action against Tyson under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and a parallel 
state law. The plaintiffs alleged that they 
were entitled to damages because Tyson 
failed to pay them overtime for time spent 
“donning” and “doffing” personal protective 
equipment and walking to and from their 
work stations. The district court certified an 
FLSA collective and Rule 23 class based on 
its conclusions regarding the existence of 
common questions about whether those 
activities were “compensable ‘work’” under 
the FLSA and the state law. At trial, the 
plaintiffs used statistical evidence of the 
average donning, doffing, and walking times 
for employees to prove liability and damages. 
The jury returned a verdict for the collective 
and class, and the final judgment totaled $5.8 
million. 
 
On appeal, Tyson contended that certification 
was improper because employees’ individual 
routines varied and, thus, the litigation could 
not generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation as required under 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011). Tyson pointed out that liability 
and damages were only inferred as to 
individual class members based on statistical 
evidence contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
“Trial by Formula” prohibition in Dukes and 
the use of damages models that ignore the 
basis of defendant’s alleged liability to each 
class member as required by Comcast v. 
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 
Tyson further argued that collective and class 
certification was inappropriate because some 
class members did not work any overtime and 
were thus not entitled to any damages. The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
these arguments, holding that liability and 
damages could be proven by inference and 
that issues relating to individual damages, or 
no damages at all, do not preclude 
certification. 
 
Citing circuit splits on both issues presented, 
Tyson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
in March 2015 which was granted today. 
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Those issues, as stated in the cert petition, 
are: 
 
(1) Whether differences among individual 
class members may be ignored and a class 
action certified under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action 
certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
where liability and damages will be 
determined with statistical techniques that 
presume all class members are identical to the 
average observed in a sample; and 
 
(2) whether a class action may be certified or 
maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a 
collective action certified or maintained 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the 
class contains hundreds of members who 
were not injured and have no legal right to 
any damages. 
 
Potential Implications for Wage & Hour 
Collective and Class Actions 
 
Even though employers have been facing an 
avalanche of wage and hour collective and 
class claims for more than a decade, the 
Supreme Court has had little to say in the 
wage and hour context about the procedures 
for litigating collective actions, class actions, 
or “hybrids” of the two. The potential for a 
game-changing ruling is a very important 
development for employers. 
 
Courts have been divided about whether the 
mere allegation of a specific type of FLSA 
violation, allegedly affecting a group of 
employees, is sufficient to show that the 
employees are “similarly situated” within the 
meaning of Section 216(b), the main 
remedies provision of the FLSA. The issue 
that the Supreme Court has now agreed to 
hear–whether a collective can properly be 
certified where the alleged FLSA violation 
affected different employees differently and 
some not at all–is an important one, 
especially in “off-the-clock” FLSA cases. 
 
The Tyson Foods case is especially 
fascinating because it involves a “hybrid” 
case, involving a Rule 23 opt-out class with 
several thousand members and an FLSA 
“collective” of 444 opt-in plaintiffs. The 
Supreme Court can be expected to address 
how its Wal-Mart and Comcast decisions–
both arising under Rule 23–apply to FLSA 
collective actions as well as state law wage 
and hour class actions. The Court’s 
prohibition in Wal-Mart of “trial by formula” 
has the potential to restrict the certification of 
collective actions, both initially and 
ultimately, to adjudicate cases with large 
numbers of plaintiffs with highly 
individualized claims. 
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DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia 
14-462 
Ruling Below: Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 4th 338 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2014) 
Plaintiff customer filed a class action complaint against defendant television service provider 
under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., and other state 
laws, and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, denied the provider's motion to 
compel arbitration. The provider appealed. 
The court of appeal held that the trial court properly denied the provider's motion to compel 
arbitration. The arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it expressly stated that the 
entire section would be unenforceable if the law of the customer's state would find the class 
action waiver unenforceable. California would have found the waiver unenforceable because 
CLRA expressly precludes waiver of the right to bring a CLRA class action. The reference to 
state law regarding enforceability of the class action waiver created a specific exception to the 
general provision that the arbitration agreement would be governed by the FAA and did not 
render that general provision meaningless. (Credit Lexis Nexis) 
Question Presented: Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict 
with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the 
Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
 
 
Amy IMBURGIA et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
v. 
DIRECTV, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant 
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One 
Filed on April 7, 2014 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County. John 
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. 
DIRECTV, Inc. moved to dismiss or stay this 
class action litigation and to compel 
arbitration. The superior court denied the 
motion. DIRECTV argues that the motion 
should have been granted under the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011). We 
conclude that under the terms of the parties’ 
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arbitration agreement, the motion was 
correctly denied. We therefore affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 17, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed 
a class action complaint against DIRECTV, 
alleging claims for unjust enrichment, 
declaratory relief, false advertising, and 
violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act (CLRA), the unfair competition law 
(UCL), and Civil Code section 1671, 
subdivision (d). Imburgia’s claims were 
based on allegations that DIRECTV has 
improperly charged early termination fees to 
its customers. Kathy Greiner filed a similar 
class action complaint one day after 
Imburgia, and Imburgia and Greiner 
(hereafter plaintiffs) jointly filed a first 
amended complaint on March 16, 2009. 
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit proceeded at the same time 
as a multidistrict litigation proceeding in 
federal court involving similar claims. 
DIRECTV moved to stay plaintiffs’ state 
court action pending the outcome of the 
multidistrict litigation, but the superior court 
denied the motion. 
Plaintiffs subsequently moved for class 
certification. On April 20, 2011, the superior 
court granted the motion in part and denied it 
in part, certifying a class as to one of 
plaintiffs’ theories but denying certification 
as to others. 
On April 27, 2011, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Concepcion, which 
held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
preempts the rule of Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court (2005). Discover Bank held 
that under certain circumstances, class action 
waivers in consumer contracts are 
unconscionable and hence unenforceable.  
On May 17, 2011, less than one month after 
the Court decided Concepcion, DIRECTV 
moved to stay or dismiss plaintiffs’ action, 
decertify the class, and compel arbitration of 
plaintiffs’ claims. DIRECTV explained that 
it had not moved to compel arbitration earlier 
because, in an unrelated case several years 
before plaintiffs filed this litigation, the Court 
of Appeal had held that the arbitration 
provision in DIRECTV’s customer 
agreement was unenforceable under 
Discover Bank. Until Concepcion held that 
the FAA preempts the rule of Discover Bank, 
DIRECTV consequently believed that a 
motion to compel arbitration would be futile. 
The relevant arbitration provision is 
contained in section 9 of DIRECTV’s 2007 
customer agreement. Section 9 provides that 
“any legal or equitable claim relating to this 
Agreement, any addendum, or your Service” 
will first be addressed through an informal 
process and, if the claim is not resolved 
informally, then “any Claim either of us 
asserts will be resolved only by binding 
arbitration” under JAMS rules. Under the 
heading “Special Rules,” section 9 of the 
agreement provides as follows: “Neither you 
nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate 
claims in arbitration by or against other 
individuals or entities, or arbitrate any claim 
as a representative member of a class or in a 
private attorney general capacity. 
Accordingly, you and we agree that the 
JAMS Class Action Procedures do not apply 
to our arbitration. If, however, the law of your 
state would find this agreement to dispense 
with class arbitration procedures 
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unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is 
unenforceable.” 
Section 10 of the 2007 customer agreement 
contains provisions addressing several 
miscellaneous matters, including the 
following provision concerning “Applicable 
Law”: “The interpretation and enforcement 
of this Agreement shall be governed by the 
rules and regulations of the Federal 
Communications Commission, other 
applicable federal laws, and the laws of the 
state and local area where Service is provided 
to you. This Agreement is subject to 
modification if required by such laws. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act.” 
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel 
arbitration on numerous grounds. The 
superior court denied the motion, and 
DIRECTV timely appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“On appeal from the denial of a motion to 
compel arbitration, ‘we review the arbitration 
agreement de novo to determine whether it is 
legally enforceable, applying general 
principles of California contract law. We 
review the superior court’s ruling, not its 
reasoning, and we consequently may affirm 
on the basis of any valid legal theory, 
regardless of whether the superior court 
relied on it.  
DISCUSSION 
In addition to stating that the parties waive 
their rights to bring class claims, section 9 of 
the 2007 customer agreement states that if 
“the law of your state would find this 
agreement to dispense with class arbitration 
procedures unenforceable, then this entire 
Section 9 is unenforceable.” Plaintiffs argue 
that the law of California would find the class 
action waiver unenforceable because, for 
example, the CLRA expressly precludes 
waiver of the right to bring a class action 
under the CLRA. Plaintiffs conclude that the 
parties’ entire arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable, pursuant to the agreement’s 
express terms, because the law of plaintiffs’ 
state would find the class action waiver 
unenforceable. We agree. 
As all parties point out, the FAA “requires 
courts to enforce privately negotiated 
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, 
in accordance with their terms.” The FAA’s 
broad policy of enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms applies 
even to “agreements to arbitrate under 
different rules than those set forth in the 
[FAA] itself.” Thus, if “parties have agreed 
to abide by state rules of arbitration, 
enforcing those rules according to the terms 
of the agreement is fully consistent with the 
goals of the FAA,” even if application of the 
state rules would yield a different result from 
application of the FAA. Consequently, 
although it is impossible for parties to “‘opt 
out’ of FAA coverage in its entirety because 
it is the FAA itself that authorizes parties to 
choose different rules in the first place,” it is 
in other respects permissible for the parties to 
“opt out of the FAA’s default rules.” In 
particular, a choice of law provision in an 
arbitration agreement is, in general, 
enforceable to the same extent as a choice of 
law provision in any other contract. We have 
previously held that the parties to a contract 
may choose the law under which the 
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enforceability of a class action waiver is to be 
determined.  
Under the foregoing principles, if section 9 of 
DIRECTV’s 2007 customer agreement had 
said that the enforceability of the class action 
waiver “shall be determined under the law of 
your state to the extent that it is not 
preempted by the FAA,” then that provision 
would have been enforceable. Likewise, if 
section 9 had said that the enforceability of 
the class action waiver “shall be determined 
under the law of your state without 
considering the preemptive effect, if any, of 
the FAA,” then that provision would have 
been enforceable as well. No party argues to 
the contrary. 
Section 9 of the 2007 customer agreement is 
not, however, as explicit as either of those 
hypothetical examples. The question before 
us, then, is how to interpret section 9’s choice 
of law concerning enforceability of the class 
action waiver. Where section 9 requires us to 
consider whether “the law of your state 
would find this agreement to dispense with 
class arbitration procedures unenforceable,” 
does it mean “the law of your state to the 
extent it is not preempted by the FAA,” or 
“the law of your state without considering the 
preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA”? 
Plaintiffs argue that it means the latter, and 
we agree. 
Plaintiffs’ principal argument in favor of 
their interpretation is that “under well 
established principles of contract 
interpretation, when a general and a 
particular provision are inconsistent, the 
particular and specific provision is 
para[]mount to the general provision.” On 
that basis, plaintiffs contend that the 
reference to “the law of your state” in section 
9 of the 2007 customer agreement operates as 
“a specific exception to the arbitration 
agreement’s general adoption of the FAA” in 
section 10. That is, although the agreement 
provides that in general section 9 is governed 
by the FAA, section 9 itself provides that the 
specific issue of the enforceability of the 
class action waiver shall be governed by “the 
law of your state.” 
DIRECTV’s sole response to that argument 
is that “the contract interpretation principle 
[p]laintiffs invoke applies only where ‘the 
provisions in question are truly 
inconsistent,’” but “there is no 
inconsistency” here because “both federal 
and state law have a role.” We are not 
persuaded. If we apply state law alone (for 
example, the antiwaiver provision of the 
CLRA) to the class action waiver, then the 
waiver is unenforceable. If we apply federal 
law, then the class action waiver is 
enforceable and any state law to the contrary 
is preempted. That is a sufficient 
inconsistency to make plaintiffs’ principle of 
contract interpretation applicable. Indeed, the 
entire preemption analysis of Concepcion is 
based on a conflict or inconsistency between 
the Discover Bank rule and the FAA.  
Our interpretation of the contract finds 
further support in “the common-law rule of 
contract interpretation that a court should 
construe ambiguous language against the 
interest of the party that drafted it.” 
DIRECTV “drafted an ambiguous document, 
and [it] cannot now claim the benefit of the 
doubt. The reason for this rule is to protect 
the party who did not choose the language 
from an unintended or unfair result.” 
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Moreover, “[t]hat rationale is well suited to 
the facts of this case” because “[a]s a 
practical matter, it seems unlikely that” 
plaintiffs anticipated in 2007 that the 
Supreme Court would hold in 2011 that the 
FAA preempts the Discover Bank rule 
concerning the enforceability of class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements. “In the 
face of such doubt, we are unwilling to 
impute this intent to [plaintiffs].” 
Finally, DIRECTV cites three cases as 
having “rejected” plaintiffs’ argument. Two 
of the cases are readily distinguishable 
because, unlike the instant case, neither of 
them involves an arbitration agreement that 
specifically provides that the enforceability 
of the class action waiver is to be decided 
under state law.  
The third case, however, is a decision in the 
federal multidistrict litigation that parallels 
the instant state court actions. In an 
“[i]ndicative [r]uling” under rule 62.1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal 
district court stated that the reference to “the 
law of your state” in section 9 of the customer 
agreement could not mean that enforceability 
of the class action waiver should be 
determined exclusively under state law, 
because that would render “meaningless” 
section 10’s general statement that the 
arbitration agreement is governed by the 
FAA. We disagree. The specific reference to 
state law concerning the enforceability of the 
class action waiver creates a narrow and 
specific exception to the general provision 
that the arbitration agreement will be 
governed by the FAA. It does not render that 
general provision meaningless. In addition, 
the district court’s analysis does not address 
the principles that a specific provision 
controls over a general one and that 
ambiguous language is construed against the 
interest of the drafter. For all of these reasons, 
we decline to follow the district court’s 
decision. 
After briefing in this appeal was completed, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit decided a similar case 
concerning the enforceability of the 
arbitration provision and class action waiver 
in DIRECTV’s customer agreement under 
Concepcion. The court held that “the 
arbitration agreement is enforceable under 
Concepcion,” which preempts any state law 
to the contrary. The court reasoned that “the 
parties’ various contract interpretation 
arguments”—which included both the 
argument that the specific reference to state 
law controlled over the general reference to 
the FAA and the argument that ambiguities 
should be construed against the drafter—“are 
largely irrelevant to our analysis,” because 
under the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, and the related doctrine 
of federal preemption, federal law is the law 
of every state.  
We find the analysis in Murphy unpersuasive. 
On the one hand, insofar as the court’s 
reasoning is a matter of contract 
interpretation, it means that when the parties 
used the phrase “the law of your state,” they 
meant “federal law plus (nonfederal) state 
law.” Murphy provides no basis for 
concluding that the parties intended to use the 
phrase “the law of your state” in such a way, 
and we are aware of none. On the contrary, a 
reasonable reader of the customer agreement 
would naturally interpret the phrase “the law 
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of your state” as referring to (nonfederal) 
state law, and any ambiguity should be 
construed against the drafter. On the other 
hand, insofar as the court reasoned that 
contract interpretation is irrelevant because 
the parties are powerless to opt out of the 
FAA by contract, we are aware of no 
authority for the court’s position. Rather, as 
we have already observed, if the customer 
agreement expressly provided that the 
enforceability of the class action waiver 
“shall be determined under the (nonfederal) 
law of your state without considering the 
preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA,” then 
that choice of law would be enforceable; 
Murphy cites no authority to the contrary. 
Consequently, the dispositive issue is 
whether the parties intended to make that 
choice. As a result, “the parties’ various 
contract interpretation arguments” are not 
“largely irrelevant.”  
To summarize: Section 9 of the 2007 
customer agreement provides that “if . . . the 
law of your state would find this agreement 
to dispense with class arbitration procedures 
unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is 
unenforceable.” The class action waiver is 
unenforceable under California law, so the 
entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable. 
The superior court therefore properly denied 
the motion to compel arbitration. 
DISPOSITION 
The order is affirmed. Respondents shall 
recover their costs of appeal. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear DirecTV Arbitration Case” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
March 23, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to hear an appeal filed by DirecTV Inc 
concerning the satellite television provider's 
efforts to enforce arbitration agreements its 
customers in California have signed. 
 
The high court agreed to review a decision by 
a state appeals court in California that found 
that consumers were not bound by a 
provision in the company's customer 
agreement preventing disputes being 
resolved on a class-wide basis. 
 
The company says that disagreements must 
be resolved individually via private 
arbitration. 
 
Consumer advocates have criticized the 
increased use of arbitration agreements that 
they say deny customers the opportunity to 
vindicate their rights in court. 
 
The litigation dates back to 2008 when Amy 
Imburgia and Kathy Grenier filed class action 
lawsuits saying that DirecTV had violated 
state law by imposing cancellation fees. 
 
DirecTV says the April 2014 ruling by the 
California Court of Appeal, Second District 
in favor of the consumers conflicts with a 
2013 decision the company won on the same 
matter that was issued by the San Francisco-
based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
The high court will hear the case during its 
next term, which starts in October and ends 
in June 2016. 
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“Direct to Arbitration: Enforcing Arbitration in Consumer 
Contracts” 
JLPP: Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 
Wayne Yu 
April 12, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court has agreed to review a 
class action lawsuit brought by consumers 
challenging DirecTV’s early termination 
fees. At issue is whether DirecTV’s customer 
agreements, which require consumer disputes 
to be settled through private arbitration as 
opposed to litigation, are enforceable. 
 
Most recently, the Second District California 
Court of Appeals ruled against DirecTV, 
finding that consumers were “not bound” by 
DirecTV’s contract provision forcing 
disputes to be settled through private 
arbitration rather than litigation. In upholding 
the decision, the California Supreme Court 
denied review, stating that “California law 
forbids arbitration agreements that include a 
class action waiver.” DirecTV petitioned for 
a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state law, 
and therefore company contracts barring 
class action lawsuits are enforceable. 
 
DirecTV, and many businesses, favor 
arbitration because the process generally 
lowers  litigation costs, and more efficiently 
resolves customer disputes. Unlike litigation, 
the arbitration process is much quicker, 
permitting companies to spend “less time 
fighting, and more time actually running their 
businesses.” 
Arbitration is also less adversarial than 
litigation. This assists in resolving disputes 
while preserving ongoing customer and 
business relationships. One of the most 
compelling advantages of arbitration is the 
ability to keep both disputes and resolutions 
private. Arbitration proceedings are usually 
private, and parties generally agree to keep 
both the proceedings and terms of the 
resolution confidential. Accordingly, 
companies attain invaluable benefits through 
arbitration if a dispute concerns 
commercially sensitive and/or embarrassing 
matters. 
 
Consumers claim that the increased use of 
arbitration denies individuals their rightful 
opportunity to vindicate their claims in court. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys assert that because 
arbitration occurs “behind closed doors,” 
arbitration is stacked in favor of the 
companies. Unlike a judge in the courtroom, 
an arbiter’s final decision is neither 
constrained nor guided by law, statutes, or 
precedent. As a result, both the lack of 
transparency and public accessibility of 
arbitration proceedings and resolutions may 
undermine the credibility and integrity of the 
process, and any final decisions of a 
presumed “objective” arbiter. Furthermore, 
unlike arbitration, litigation encourages and 
permits extensive discovery and full 
disclosure of evidence to all parties involved 
in a dispute. 
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Perhaps, the most important difference 
between litigation and arbitration is the right 
to appeal. In arbitration, the arbitrator’s 
decision is generally not subject to review. 
Accordingly, consumers disapprove of 
arbitration because they believe that 
“mistakes are made frequently,” and that the 
right to request a “second look” is both vital 
and important. The process of litigation 
preserves such rights through the appeals 
process. 
 
Given the pros and cons of either arbitration 
or litigation, it is unclear which process is 
better for settling disputes and reaching 
resolutions. However, the Supreme Court 
will determine whether arbitration clauses 
barring class action lawsuits are enforceable, 
when it hears DirecTV Inc. v. Amy Imburgia, 
et al. this fall. This determination should 
hopefully settle the dispute once and for all. 
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“Recent California Appellate Opinion Raises Issue of Concepcion’s 
Scope” 
National Law Review 
May 2, 2014 
 
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011), cleared the way for 
consumer products companies and other 
businesses to incorporate class action waivers 
into their arbitration agreements with 
customers.  On April 7, 2014, the Second 
District Court of Appeal in California 
affirmed the denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration despite Concepcion, relying on 
language in the arbitration clause that 
rendered the clause invalid if state law would 
find the class action waiver unenforceable.  
The decision appears to contradict a recent 
Ninth Circuit decision, calling into question 
Concepcion’s scope and ensuring further 
litigation of the issue. 
 
In Imburgia v. DirecTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 190 (2014), Plaintiffs accused DirecTV of 
improperly charging early termination fees 
and brought a class action against the 
company for false advertising, violation of 
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act 
(CLRA) and related claims.  After the trial 
court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for 
class certification, Concepcion came down 
and DirecTV moved to decertify the class and 
compel arbitration.  DirecTV’s arbitration 
clause included a class action waiver and 
provided generally that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, but also 
provided:  “If, however, the law of your state 
would find this agreement to dispense with 
class arbitration procedures unenforceable, 
then this entire Section … is unenforceable.” 
 
The trial court denied the motion based on 
this language, and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed, finding that “the law of California 
would find the class action waiver 
unenforceable because, for example, the 
CLRA expressly precludes waiver of the 
right to bring a class action under the CLRA.”  
 
DirecTV argued that the decision was 
contrary to Concepcion and its broad 
interpretation of the FAA.  However, the 
Court stated, “[t]he FAA’s broad policy of 
enforcement of arbitration agreements 
according to their terms applies even to 
‘agreements to arbitrate under different rules 
than those set forth in the [FAA] itself.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, based on the 
California rule of contract interpretation that 
a specific provision controls over a general 
one, “the reference to ‘the law of your state’ 
in [the arbitration agreement] operates as ‘a 
specific exception to the arbitration 
agreement’s general adoption of the FAA’” 
found elsewhere in the agreement. In 
addition, the Court held, Plaintiffs’ 
“interpretation of the contract finds further 
support in ‘the common-law rule of contract 
interpretation that a court should construe 
ambiguous language against the interest of 
the party that drafted it.’”   
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DirecTV relied on the recent Ninth Circuit 
case of Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 
1218 (9th Cir. 2013), which was decided after 
briefing in the Imburgia appeal was 
completed.  There, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the class action waiver in DirecTV’s 
customer agreement was enforceable under 
Concepcion, which preempts contrary state 
law. The Court of Appeals reasoned that 
“‘the parties’ various contract interpretation 
arguments’—which included both the 
argument that the specific reference to state 
law controlled over the general reference to 
the FAA and the argument that ambiguities 
should be construed against the drafter — 
‘are largely irrelevant to our analysis,’ 
because under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, and the related 
doctrine of federal preemption, federal law is 
the law of every state.”   
 
The California Court of Appeal was 
unpersuaded:  “a reasonable reader of the 
customer agreement would naturally 
interpret the phrase ‘the law of your state’ as 
referring to (nonfederal) state law, and any 
ambiguity should be construed against the 
drafter. On the other hand, insofar as the court 
reasoned that contract interpretation is 
irrelevant because the parties are powerless 
to opt out of the FAA by contract, we are 
aware of no authority for the court’s 
position.”   
 
DirecTV’s counsel has stated that the 
company intends to appeal.  Thus, the extent 
to which parties are indeed powerless to opt 
out of the FAA because “federal law is the 
law of every state,” or whether state law 
contract principles may allow them to do so, 
remains undecided.  Based on the broad 
scope of the FAA as interpreted by 
Concepcion and Murphy, it is far from clear 
that the Imburgia decision will survive. 
  
 
